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Executive Summary
The European Anti-Fraud Office stepped up its game 
throughout last year, concentrating on large, transna-
tional investigations, which often led to multi-million 
euro financial recommendations. 
In 2016 OLAF has continued to perform very well, open-
ing 219 investigations after a detailed process of ana-
lysing incoming information in 1157 selections. In the 
same time span, OLAF concluded 272 investigations, 
following which it issued 346 recommendations to the 
competent authorities at EU and national level. As a 
result of the investigations it concluded in 2016, OLAF 
recommended the recovery of EUR 631 million, money 
which will gradually by returned to the EU budget to 
fund projects that stimulate growth and jobs. In 2016, 
OLAF has also succeeded in further reducing the dura-
tion of its investigations, to 18.9 months, a new record 
for the Office.
OLAF’s unique mandate allows the Office to have a 
complete picture of the changing nature of fraud with 
European Union funds. For the first time, the OLAF 
Report presents the most striking trends in fraud with 
EU funds. OLAF’s analysis uncovered, for example, that 
public procurement is still an attractive marketplace for 
fraudsters, who use corruption and off-shore accounts 
as fraud facilitators. Research and Employment Grants 
constitute a similarly lucrative fraud business, with dou-
ble-funding and employment subsidy fraud becoming 
increasingly popular.  
In addition to its investigation and coordination cases, 
in 2016 OLAF co-organised or supported 12 successful 
Joint Customs Operations (JCOs) and has made signifi-
cant progress in its efforts to fight the illicit trade in to-
bacco products, helping national authorities seize 469 
million cigarette sticks.
In the past years, OLAF has significantly invested in the 
most innovative investigative techniques and tools. This 
helped the Office acquire state of the art forensic and 
analytical tools, which ensure that OLAF continues to 
remain at the forefront of the global fight against fraud. 
In 2016, OLAF used these tools to analyse the Panama 
Papers, which led to the Office opening a number of 
investigations.  
In 2016, OLAF also supported the European Commission 
in making progress on two important policy initiatives. 
In one case, it was decided that serious VAT offences 
would be included in the scope of the Directive on the 
fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by 
means of criminal law (so-called “PIF directive”). At the 
same time, it became clear that the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) would be established under 
an enhanced cooperation procedure. 
In this Report, OLAF Director General Giovanni Kessler 
also takes the opportunity to present an assessment of 
OLAF’s work over the last years, as well as a vision for 
the future of the Office. 
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Foreword
I am very pleased to present you with the 2016 edition of the Annual Report of the 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). Over the last year, OLAF has not only upheld 
its strong investigative performance, but it has focused on large, transnational 
cases, where its expertise and involvement could make a significant difference to 
the EU taxpayers by delivering concrete results in protecting their money and the 
EU budget overall. OLAF has continued to build on the foundation laid when the 
Office was reformed in 2012, while constantly reducing the duration of investiga-
tions. As a result of this work, the Office recommended in 2016 the recovery of 
EUR 631 million to the EU budget. 
Whenever the previous editions of OLAF Reports were published, we unfailingly 
received questions related to the nature of our investigations and to the trends we 
could identify in cases of fraud and irregularities affecting EU funding. Our insti-
tutional stakeholders, as well as EU citizens and journalists, were interested in the 
types of cases we mostly encountered, in the changing nature of fraud patterns, as 
well as in the types of actions which would prompt an OLAF investigation. This is 
why we decided to focus this year on helping our readers understand the substance 
of OLAF’s investigative work and the recent trends that our investigations have 
brought to light. You will therefore be able to find out in this Report why public pro-
curement is still attractive for fraudsters, how off-shore accounts are increasingly 
used to hide the proceeds of such crimes, how corruption is still an almost universal 
aspect found in our cases, or how undervaluation fraud is perpetrated by highly 
organised criminal gangs operating across borders. 
This detailed view into what constitutes the challenging and diverse work of an 
OLAF investigator will show you how internal reforms and constant development 
have helped OLAF transition into not only a high-performing investigative body, but 
one with a clear focus and ability to solve large, complex, cross-border cases, often 
recommending multi-million euro recoveries. 
To support its investigators in delivering quality results, OLAF has developed 
and promoted state-of-the art investigative techniques and tools. With text min-
ing and analytical capabilities which are, at this point, almost unparalleled in 
Europe for an administrative body, OLAF was able to take on complex challeng-
es in 2016, such as analysing the Panama Papers. So this year, we’ve also given 
some prominence to innovation at OLAF, an aspect that is often less known to 
our readers, but is quintessential in backing the efficiency of a modern investi-
gative body.
OLAF owes its excellent results to the skills, dedication and commitment of its out-
standing staff, who have worked tirelessly to ensure that EU citizens’ money is well 
protected, and that fraudsters are rightfully brought to justice. OLAF is also grateful 
for the positive cooperation of European Member States and Institutional Partners 
at EU and international level.
Last but not least, as this is the last year of my mandate, I would like to thank 
all of you for contributing to and for supporting OLAF’s work. It is with the help 
of responsible European citizens who understand the importance of ensuring EU 
funds are spent lawfully that we are truly able to protect the financial interests 
of the European Union, and to hold EU staff to the highest standards of ethical 
behaviour. I would like to also express my deep admiration for OLAF staff, whom I 
am proud to have worked with for almost  seven years – I could not have asked for 
a better, more competent team!
Giovanni Kessler
Director-General of OLAF
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1. Mission and mandate 
MISSION
Detect, investigate and work towards stopping fraud 
involving European Union funds.
MANDATE
OLAF’s mandate is:
  to conduct independent investigations into fraud 
and corruption involving EU funds so as to ensure 
that all EU taxpayers’ money reaches projects 
that can stimulate the creation of jobs and growth 
in Europe;
  to investigate serious misconduct by EU staff and 
members of the EU institutions, thus contributing to 
strengthening citizens’ trust in the EU institutions;
  to develop EU policies to counter fraud.
INVESTIGATIVE COMPETENCES
OLAF can investigate matters relating to fraud, corrup-
tion and other offences affecting EU financial interests 
concerning: 
  all EU expenditure: the main spending categories 
are structural funds, agricultural policy and rural 
development funds, direct expenditure and 
external aid;
  some areas of EU revenue, mainly customs duties;
OLAF can also open investigations into suspicions of 
serious misconduct by EU staff and members of the EU 
institutions.
OLAF is part of the European Commission and, as such, 
under the responsibility of Commissioner Günther 
Oettinger. 
However, in its investigative mandate, OLAF acts in full 
independence. 
WHAT WE DO
OLAF’s investigative work broadly involves:
  assessing  incoming information of potential 
investigative interest to determine whether 
there are sufficient grounds for OLAF to open an 
investigation;
  conducting administrative investigations, where 
appropriate in cooperation with national criminal or 
administrative investigative authorities and with EU 
and international bodies;
  supporting the anti-fraud investigations of national 
authorities;
  recommending necessary actions that should be 
taken by the relevant EU or national authorities;
  monitoring the actions taken by these authorities, 
in order to assess the impact of OLAF’s work in the 
fight against fraud, and better tailor the support we 
provide to relevant national authorities.
10
The OLAF report 2016
Responsibilities for much of EU spending are shared 
between European, national, regional and local levels. 
Even where EU institutions manage funds directly, 
the money is often spent across national borders, and 
sometimes outside the EU. The detection, investigation 
and prosecution of fraud against the EU budget can 
therefore only be conducted in cooperation with a 
wide range of partners, at national, European and 
international level. 
OLAF cases frequently concern: 
  cross-border procurement fraud or corruption 
in public procurement procedures involving EU 
financing;
  double funding, where, through deceit, a project 
is funded several times by different donors who 
are unaware of the contributions the others made;
  subsidy fraud in different forms, as fraudsters 
take advantage of the difficulties of managing 
and controlling transnational expenditure 
programmes. Examples include the delivery of 
the same piece of research to several funding 
authorities within or beyond EU borders, 
plagiarism – the copying of research which has 
already been undertaken by others, and the 
deliberate gross disrespect of the conditions of 
financial assistance;
  customs fraud whereby fraudsters attempt to 
avoid paying customs duties (EU own resources), 
for instance by smuggling goods into the EU.
EU bodies are, like other employers, at risk of fraud 
from their members and staff in relation to remuner-
ation, allowances, travel and relocation expenses, so-
cial security and health entitlements. They may also 
be at risk from corrupt activity by members and staff 
in procurement procedures, and from other forms of 
corruption such as attempts to illicitly influence deci-
sion-making and recruitment procedures. To some de-
gree, these risks are enhanced by the transnational na-
ture of EU business, which also makes investigations 
more complex. OLAF thus has a unique mandate to 
carry out so-called “internal” investigations into alle-
gations of misconduct involving staff and members of 
the EU institutions.
11
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Figure 1: EU expenditure in 2016
0.2 %
Special instruments
Security and citizenship
Sustainable growth:
natural resources
Administration
Smart and inclusive growth
43.4 %
40.2 %
2.2 %
Global Europe
7.4 %
6.6 %
1.7
Total 
expenditure
EUR 136.64
billion
(1) Source: OJ L51, 28.2.2017, p. 13
Disclaimer: these are based on final amounts but are still subject to reliability checks by the European Court of Auditors
Figure 2: EU revenue in 2016
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(1) Source: OJ L51, 28.2.2017, p. 14
Disclaimer: these are based on final amounts but are still subject to reliability checks by the European Court of Auditors
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2. OLAF investigative activity: current trends 
in anti-fraud investigations
In the last five years OLAF has undergone a major 
transformation, with a significant effort deployed by 
management and staff together to improve the effi-
ciency of its investigative function. This strategy has 
borne fruit, with OLAF transitioning into a highly 
performing body, with a clear focus on dealing with 
complex cases and delivering concrete results for EU 
taxpayers. Overheads were reduced, resources rede-
ployed to the extent maximum on investigations and 
the necessary infrastructure investments made to 
support this investigative drive. As mentioned in the 
OLAF Report 2015, the Office has reached “cruising 
altitude” in its investigative performance over the 
last two years, given the resources it currently has. 
This is why in this year’s Report, beyond presenting 
performance indicators, we will focus on showcasing 
the substance of OLAF’s investigative work and recent 
trends that our investigations have revealed.
2.1. Summary of OLAF’s investigative 
performance in 2016
In a nutshell, the performance indicators displayed above 
show that in 2016 OLAF has continued to perform very 
well, fully in line with the path followed in previous years. 
OLAF opened 219 investigations after a detailed process 
of analysing incoming information in 1157 selections. It 
concluded 272 investigations pursuant to which it issued 
346 recommendations to the competent authorities at 
EU and national level. As a result of its investigations 
concluded in the year, OLAF recommended the recov-
ery of EUR 631 million to the EU budget. These funds 
will gradually return to the budget so that they can be 
reattributed to projects that can stimulate growth and 
jobs in Europe. In 2016, OLAF has also succeeded in fur-
ther reducing the duration of its investigations, to 18.9 
months overall, with the selection duration correspond-
ing to these cases remaining at an average of 1.7 months. 
For a detailed presentation of these and other indicators, 
please refer to the Annex to this Report.
Figure 3: OLAF’s investigative activity in 2016: maintaining excellent results
1 157
Selections completed
346
Recommendations
issued
219
Investigations
opened
272
Investigations 
concluded
EUR 
631.1
million
Recommended
for financial
recovery
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Figure 4: An example of undervaluation fraud uncovered by OLAF
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4.
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gets paid.
2.a.
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2.b.
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3.
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 undervalued, 
at EU import
Further details on this case are presented in this chapter.
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Figure 5: Investigations into the use of EU funds managed in whole or in part at national or regional 
level concluded in 2016
Concluded with 
recommendations
Romania 21 11
Poland 16 8
Hungary 13 11
Bulgaria 11 4
Greece 9 3
Italy 8 6
Slovakia 8 5
Czech Republic 5 1
Portugal 5 2
Croatia 4 1
Netherlands 4 1
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 4 2
France 3 2
Lithuania 3 1
Germany 2 1
Sri Lanka 2 2
United Kingdom 2 2
Austria, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, 
Israel, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Malawi, Nepal, 
Niger, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Togo, Turkey, Zimbabwe
21 (1 per country) 14
Total 141 77
Figure 6: Ongoing investigations at the end of 2016, divided by sector
Sector 2014 2015 2016
Structural Funds 111 104 69
External Aid 79 66 52
Centralised Expenditure 49 58 59
Customs and Trade 56 50 60
EU Staff 43 37 48
Agricultural Funds 60 36 21
Social Funds 42 21 19
Tobacco and Counterfeit goods 21 18 8
New Financial Instruments 13 8 8
Total 474 398 344
Following the practice established in previous years, we 
present below a breakdown of the investigations con-
cluded by OLAF in 2016, concerning the use of EU funds 
managed integrally or partially at national or regional lev-
el. This is not to be read as a ranking of fraud in Europe, 
but rather seeks to present the geographical focus of 
OLAF’s investigative activity in 2016, which also relies 
on the amount, type and quality of information received. 
Figure 6 shows that, as was the case in previous years, 
the structural funds sector remains at the core of 
OLAF’s investigative activity. In 2016, it was closely fol-
lowed by the customs and trade sector where OLAF has 
started carrying out more investigations. 
15
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OLAF’s Director-General participates in a Joint Customs Operation at the border between Romania and Moldova
2.2. OLAF at the helm of large, 
complex, cross-border 
investigations
Beyond the indicators highlighted in the previous sec-
tion, in this year’s Report we delve deeper into OLAF’s 
investigative work in order to outline the trends iden-
tified by OLAF investigators in recent cases, most of 
which were concluded in 2016. This analysis is based on 
empirical evidence, without therefore being a compre-
hensive list of concluded OLAF investigations. OLAF 
has a unique mandate to fight fraud affecting European 
Union financing. It also benefits from a unique position 
since the transnational dimension of its work allows it 
to have a complete picture of the changing nature of 
fraud patterns across Europe. In recent years, OLAF 
has strived to focus on those fraud cases with the larg-
est impact, investigations of a complex, cross-border 
nature, where its trans-European view brings a clear 
added-value to curbing fraud. As a result, we note that 
while Europe has evolved in numerous ways, from the 
different political context, to an increasingly liberal-
ised market, fraudsters have also adapted to this new 
context, constantly coming up with novel and creative 
ways to try to pocket EU money. We present below an 
analysis of some of the most striking trends revealed by 
OLAF investigations.
A. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: STILL AN 
ATTRACTIVE “MARKET PLACE” FOR 
FRAUDSTERS, WHERE CORRUPTION AND 
THE USE OF OFF-SHORE ACCOUNTS ACT 
AS FRAUD FACILITATORS
Ask any OLAF investigator and they would tell you that 
a large part of their caseload relates to allegations of 
fraud in public procurement. Thorough document 
verifications and meticulous on-the-spot checks made 
by OLAF have revealed several underlying issues that 
make this particular area more prone to fraudulent ac-
tivities. For instance, some of the applicable national 
public procurement laws, ordinances or decisions are 
complicated and written in a manner that is unclear and 
difficult to apply even by the contracting authorities. 
Moreover, some authorities lack the administrative ca-
pacity and expertise to implement the rules in a coher-
ent and consistent way, while in certain cases, members 
of the evaluation committees are insufficiently quali-
fied, especially when appraising complex infrastructure 
tender proposals. Furthermore, when audits, controls 
and checks are conducted by the regulatory authori-
ties, they are sometimes carried out in a superficial or 
inadequate manner.
16
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For example, an OLAF investigation into 
tenders for EU-funded projects meant 
to develop inland waterways in Croatia 
revealed how expenditure in a niche market, 
where there were only few participants capable of 
providing the services requested and a small number 
of potential bidders, can create the perfect fraud 
story. OLAF’s investigation revealed that a local 
businessman controlled the tender procedure by 
getting access to confidential material and steering 
the technical requirements to his advantage. He 
then conspired with other European companies to 
rig the market. By acting in a coordinated manner, 
the fraudsters were able to exclude competitors and 
divide EU-funded projects between themselves. 
OLAF worked with national authorities to gather 
evidence; criminal investigations are still on-going 
in three Member States. OLAF also made a Financial 
Recommendation to the European Commission to 
recover EUR 1.2 million.
In light of such issues, OLAF experts have developed 
over the last years a system of “Red flags”1 which 
can indicate whether a particular procurement pro-
ject has a higher probability of suffering from fraud 
or corruption. Red flags can relate to bidders (who 
could for example, have multiple undeclared connec-
tions between them), to evaluation teams, or to the 
procedures themselves (very large tenders, too short 
timespan for the application process, changes in the 
project description after the award, etc). 
Such “red flags” were for instance apparent 
in an investigation OLAF concluded in 2016 
into a EUR 17.6 million cross-border fraud 
case. The investigation uncovered a fictitious sub-
contracting scheme used to artificially increase the 
prices declared for the supply of medical equipment 
from the Czech Republic to Slovakia. OLAF’s 
investigation established that the public procurement 
procedure for the contract had been seriously 
breached and that prices of the medical equipment 
supplied had been grossly overstated, therefore 
causing serious damage to the EU financial interests. 
OLAF made a Financial Recommendation to the 
European Commission to recover all of the EU funds in 
question and issued a Judicial Recommendation to the 
Slovak Judicial Authorities to further follow-up on the 
matters uncovered. 
1 https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/antifraud/files/
docs/body/identifying_reducing_corruption_in_public_
procurement_en.pdf 
With many procurement fraud cases being transna-
tional, the new fraud scenarios often involve a contract-
ing authority from one Member State and bidders from 
several other Member States who subcontract their 
works to companies again placed in different countries. 
An investigation into fraud with EU funds 
that were meant to finance free food 
programmes for the poorest European 
citizens, which OLAF concluded in 2016, perfectly 
illustrates this trend. A criminal gang in Bulgaria 
used a complex scheme of phantom purchases, 
sales companies and off-shore accounts to hide the 
proceeds they received in exchange for corrupting 
senior officials in a Paying Agency in Romania. As a 
result of corruption-related serious criminal acts, the 
officials made false declarations and illegal advance 
payments for products that were never delivered. 
This led to EUR 26.7 million being diverted from to 
the EU budget, with the criminal gang making an 
additional EUR 5.98 million in “market profit” from the 
irregular sale of the products on the open market. In 
the course of its enquiries, OLAF uncovered that, in 
perpetrating the fraudulent acts, the criminal network 
carried out illegal activities in at least eight different 
countries, six of which were EU Member States. To 
help ensure the funds can actually benefit some 
of the most vulnerable members of society, OLAF 
made a Financial Recommendation to the European 
Commission to recover EUR 26.7 million. Judicial 
proceedings in the case are on-going in both Romania 
and Bulgaria.
The use of off-shore accounts to hide the proceeds 
of crimes is indeed often used in large public procure-
ment cases. 
In 2016, for example, OLAF concluded an 
investigation into a EUR 1.7 billion euro 
transport project in Hungary, in which 
several international specialist construction firms 
were the main players. Using its cross border powers, 
OLAF conducted enquiries in Hungary and in the UK 
and traced the projects links to companies in third 
countries. OLAF also checked the contractor bids, 
the use of sub-contractors, the use of consultancy 
companies, as well as the use of off-shore accounts. 
The investigation revealed very serious irregularities as 
well as possible fraud and corruption in the execution 
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of the project. As a result of its investigation, OLAF 
recommended to the European Commission to recover 
EUR 228 million, and to the European Investment Bank 
to recover a further EUR 55 million. OLAF also made 
Judicial Recommendations to both Hungary and to 
the UK, advising them to take the OLAF findings into 
account in the judicial proceedings that are on-going in 
these Member States. 
If there is one other common thread running through 
OLAF’s investigations in general, and the public pro-
curement ones in particular, that would be the exist-
ence and use of corruption. 
For instance, in another case, OLAF received 
allegations from an anonymous source 
concerning an EU-funded competitiveness 
project in Kosovo2. The allegations indicated abuse 
of power, disclosure of confidential information 
about the evaluation of the tender proposals, 
corruptive practices and procedural irregularities. 
The available information suggested the possible 
collusion of an EU staff with an official of a Ministry 
and a representative of a company involved in the 
bidding process. OLAF coordinated its investigation 
with the national judicial authorities of Kosovo. The 
2 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, 
and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the 
Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
investigation confirmed the allegations regarding the 
attempted tender manipulation. OLAF discovered 
that the Ministry official and the representative of 
the bidding company were exchanging confidential 
information during the evaluation in their attempts 
to steer the outcome of the tender procedure. It 
was also clarified that the EU staff was not involved 
in these manipulation attempts. Following the 
completion of the investigation in 2016, OLAF sent 
the information it gathered to the judicial authorities 
of Kosovo. This information was consequently 
used to initiate court proceedings against the two 
individuals.  
OLAF can and does investigate wherever 
European funds are spent, in and outside 
the EU. In one such case, an EU Delegation 
located in an African country suspected irregularities 
and potential fraud related to a tender procedure by 
which a public works contract had been awarded to a 
local company. The European Development Funds at 
stake amounted to almost EUR 3 million. A financial 
audit launched by the EU Delegation highlighted 
financial irregularities, mostly ineligible costs and 
detected several irregularities in relation to the 
tender procedure set up under the responsibility 
of the institutional partner, such as numerous 
cancelations of successive tender processes for 
this works contract and the final awarding of the 
OLAF uncovers complex transnational cases working closely with Member States 
18
The OLAF report 2016
contract to the long-standing historical partner 
of this institution. In its investigation, OLAF was 
able to collect evidence proving that the work 
contract was unlawfully awarded to this established 
local partner in breach of procurement rules. The 
local partner was found to have previously been 
associated in the elaboration of the Terms of 
Reference for this works contract, he did not meet 
the eligibility criteria for being awarded the contract 
and was almost going bankrupt when applying for 
the contract. OLAF was able to demonstrate that 
a person working inside the institutional partner 
and the manager of the winning contractor had 
engaged in corruption. Copies of several supporting 
documents were collected proving that the winning 
contractor had been informed in advance about 
the details of the call for tender,  that bribes had 
been agreed in advance between the two persons 
involved, and that additional bribes were to be 
paid to local administrative authorities with the 
awarded EU funds. The bribes were actually paid 
with cash withdrawn from the bank account of the 
contractor where the EU funds were transferred, 
and were registered in the accounting system as 
“administrative and representation costs.” OLAF 
issued Financial Recommendations For the recovery 
of a large part of the EU funds at stake. 
B. RESEARCH AND EMPLOYMENT 
GRANTS: A LUCRATIVE FRAUD BUSINESS?
In the last years, OLAF has investigated a significant 
number of fraud cases in the academic and research 
fields. Increasingly, OLAF investigators have had to deal 
with cross border cases concerning employment subsi-
dy fraud involving universities and research institutes. 
With the help of EU grants, research and industry profes-
sionals can disseminate their knowledge. Unfortunately, 
there are individuals who seek to defraud the EU budget 
in the context of such exchanges. 
More generally, fraud involving employment grants 
mostly relates to double funding, whereby employers 
are receiving a subsidy from a Member State to fund 
their employment, part of which is paid from EU fund-
ing, while at the same time the company who employs 
them is charging 100% of their time to an EU project. 
This is often coupled with claims for artificially inflated 
working hours.
A recent OLAF investigation involved 
persons from four different Member 
States and third countries and concerned 
allegations of systematic fraud in the recruitment 
and secondment of a large number of researchers 
engaged in several EU research projects. The 
persons involved had falsified CVs and timesheets 
and had made false declarations about exchanges 
of researchers, as well as about appointments of 
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persons who either were not eligible to take part in 
the project, or who had personal links to the project 
managers. This deprived genuine researchers of 
funding. The OLAF investigation was carried out in 
close cooperation with Member State authorities 
and involved more than EUR 3 million in EU funds. 
The investigation was concluded with Financial and 
Judicial Recommendations. 
C. REVENUE FRAUD: COMPLEX 
TRANSNATIONAL SCHEMES TO EVADE 
CUSTOMS DUTIES RUN BY CRIMINAL 
NETWORKS
A particularly profitable area of customs fraud is the 
evasion of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties. 
Fraudsters may attempt to evade the duties by misde-
claring the type of product at import or by claiming it 
has originated in other countries than it really did, in 
order to benefit from preferential tariffs. This may be 
done by swapping containers en route to Europe and 
providing false sets of documents, or, in the more com-
plex cases, by setting up fake factories allegedly pro-
ducing the items in question.
The EU imposed anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties on biodiesel produced 
in the United States in 2009 and in Argentina 
and Indonesia in 2013. Following the introduction of 
such measures, OLAF experts generally monitor and 
analyse import flows to identify any sudden changes 
in the declared countries of origin which might point 
to customs fraud. OLAF investigators immediately 
started noticing cases where biodiesel was stored in 
third countries, such as India and Canada, and then re-
exported to the European Union, declared as having 
originated in these two countries. OLAF investigators 
also started noticing large amounts of biodiesel 
coming into the EU via the Western Balkans. OLAF 
opened an investigation to see if biodiesel was indeed 
being illegally imported into Europe. 
The Stabilisation and Association Agreements 
between the EU and the Western Balkan countries 
gave OLAF the possibility to request assistance 
from the countries in question. OLAF also received 
assistance from Dutch, Italian and US authorities. 
Moreover, further evidence of fraudulent 
transhipment was collected during a joint enquiry 
carried out by OLAF together with Dutch and Italian 
customs authorities as well as with local customs 
authorities from the Western Balkans. The legal 
and technical expertise available in OLAF and the 
international administrative assistance amongst 
customs authorities were put to good use in solving 
this complex investigation. OLAF established that the 
biodiesel coming into Europe from the countries that 
had imposed anti-dumping duties was falsely declared 
as originating in Africa. Sometimes, the quantity 
declared was lower than the real one, or the product 
was kept in temporary storage in a particular EU 
country for a certain amount of time, in order to make 
the product difficult to trace back. Other times, when 
imported into the Western Balkans, the biodiesel was 
declared as another chemical product altogether. As 
a result of this investigation, OLAF has recommended 
the recovery of over EUR 2 million. 
OLAF investigators have, in the last years, been faced 
with increasingly complex customs fraud cases – mostly 
undervaluation fraud - perpetrated by highly organ-
ised international criminal gangs. 
OLAF investigated a major case of customs 
fraud whose consequences were felt all 
over the EU. Though concluded in early 
2017, the case progressed substantially throughout 
2016. OLAF investigators and analysts identified a 
fraud pattern employed by international organised 
crime groups who scouted ports in the EU with 
the weakest controls, in order to get away with 
declaring falsely low values for textiles and footwear 
imported from China. This is an example of so-called 
undervaluation fraud, whereby importers can derive 
profit from evading customs duties and related taxes, 
paying much less than what is legally due. OLAF’s 
investigation revealed that the single most significant 
hub for this fraudulent traffic was in place in the UK. 
In the context of this investigation, OLAF carried 
out an extensive analysis of all customs declarations 
presented in the UK for all imports of textiles and 
shoes from China between 2013 and 2016. For 
example, OLAF found women’s trousers imported 
from China were declared at customs in the UK at an 
average price of EUR 0.91 per kg, although in the same 
period, the world market price for the raw material 
(cotton) alone was EUR 1.44 per kg and the average 
declared value in the whole of the EU for the same 
products was EUR 26.09 per kg.
OLAF calculated a loss to the EU budget of almost 
EUR 1.987 billion in customs duties. The investigation 
also revealed substantial VAT evasion in connection 
with imports through the UK by abusing the 
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suspension of the payment of VAT, the so-called 
customs procedure 423. As the goods are destined 
for the markets of other Member States, it is the 
revenues of those Member States, such as France, 
Spain, Germany and Italy that are mainly affected. 
These VAT losses are cumulatively estimated in the 
range of EUR 3.2 billion for the period 2013-2016. 
Despite repeated efforts deployed by OLAF, 
and in contrast to the actions taken by several 
other Member States to fight against these 
fraudsters, the fraud hub in the UK has continued 
to grow. As a result, OLAF has issued a Financial 
Recommendation addressed to the European 
Commission for the recovery from the UK to 
the EU budget of the EUR 1.987 billion4  lost in 
customs duties, as well as an administrative 
recommendation aimed at preventing the abuse of 
customs procedure 42. A judicial recommendation 
was addressed to the UK Crown Prosecution Service 
to initiate judicial proceedings against those 
involved in fraudulently evading customs duties 
and against those knowingly involved in laundering 
the proceeds of this offence. The UK HMRC (Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) also received an 
OLAF recommendation to take all necessary actions 
to implement risk indicators to effectively mitigate 
the undervaluation risks for importations of textiles 
and footwear from China, as well as to take all 
appropriate measures to recover the customs duties 
evaded to the extent possible. 
Complex customs fraud does not always deal with 
undervaluation of goods. Tackling the smuggling of 
counterfeit products is also an important area of 
OLAF’s work, in its efforts to protect the EU budget as 
well as more broadly the health of European citizens. 
In a case of 2016, OLAF investigators 
checked a system connecting several 
customs authorities where Risk 
Information Form messages are exchanged and 
noticed that the Czech authorities had signalled a 
3 Customs procedure 42 provides for non-EU goods to be 
released into free circulation in an EU Member State exempted 
from import VAT on the condition that these goods will 
be transported to another Member State due to an intra-
community transaction.
4 As this case was concluded in 2017, the EUR 1.987 billion 
recommended for recovery are not included in the 2016 figure 
of financial recommendations presented in this report.
seizure of counterfeit ball bearings imported from 
China into the Czech Republic. OLAF investigators 
got in touch with the Czech authorities, and 
transmitted the information they received as a 
Mutual Assistance communication to all Member 
States, warning the latter to be on the look-out 
for additional such consignments. As a result, 
French Customs informed OLAF about three 
containers containing 21 tonnes of counterfeit 
bearings destined for a company in Spain. Spanish 
customs, together with OLAF investigators and 
representatives of the rights-holding company, 
carried out a control at the Spanish company 
in question, which resulted in over 3 tonnes of 
counterfeit bearings being seized. OLAF’s work 
did not stop there. OLAF investigators went to 
establish that the Spanish company imported 
counterfeit bearings from a Chinese company, 
which appeared to be active and continuing its 
trade in counterfeit bearings worldwide, including 
in the EU. Based on this information, OLAF, via its 
Liaison Officer in China, requested the Chinese 
authorities to conduct an investigation concerning 
this particular Chinese company. OLAF also 
requested information from Hong Kong authorities 
regarding a company involved in the illegal traffic 
of counterfeit bearings seized in France and Spain. 
Investigations are on-going.
D. THE CHANGING NATURE OF 
CIGARETTE SMUGGLING
The prevalence of contraband on the EU tobacco mar-
ket has significantly decreased in the last decade. A 
Commission Staff Working Paper published in 2016 
showed, for example, that contraband in genuine 
Phillips Morris products on the illicit EU tobacco mar-
ket dropped by around 85% from 2006 to 2014. This, 
however, did not lead to an overall reduction of illicit 
products on the EU market as smugglers turned their 
attention to traffic with “cheap whites,” which are 
non-branded cigarettes. 
A five-month operation in which OLAF 
worked closely with EU Member States 
and the customs authorities of third 
countries to track suspicious shipments of 
cigarettes resulted in the seizure of more than 58 
million cigarettes in the Port of Piraeus, Greece, 
in early 2016. The cigarettes had been produced in 
South-East European countries, but were declared 
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as meant for export to Asia. Initially transhipped 
through different European ports before being 
moved to Asia, the cheap whites were then 
shipped to a second Asian country, loaded into 
containers declared as garden sets or stones, and 
then transported back to Europe. As a result of 
OLAF’s collaboration with authorities in Asia and 
Greece, the five containers used for this smuggling 
operation were identified and closely monitored 
until their arrival in Europe. The criminal network 
smuggling the goods was found to have used off-
shore companies and false documents in order to 
hide their illicit activities.
In all the above-cited cases mentioned in this section, 
OLAF has been in the driving seat of large, complex, 
cross-border cases where it has succeeded in bring-
ing a clear added-value on a European and often in-
ternational scale. After reaching its “cruising altitude” 
in terms of investigative performance following its 
complete reorganisation five years ago, OLAF is now 
a unique central point in Europe for conducting intri-
cate administrative investigations and delivering con-
crete results for the EU taxpayers. It has the experts, 
tools and capacities to detect new fraud trends and to 
adapt investigative techniques to be one step ahead 
of fraudsters.
2.3. OLAF’s investigative mandate 
within the EU Institutions 
OLAF also has a unique mandate to carry out internal 
investigations into the EU Institutions, Bodies, Offices 
and Agencies for the purpose of fighting fraud, corrup-
tion and any other illegal activity affecting the financial 
interests of the Union. The Office investigates serious 
matters relating to the discharge of professional duties 
constituting a dereliction of the obligations of EU offi-
cials liable to result in disciplinary or, as the case may 
be, criminal proceedings, or an equivalent failure to 
discharge obligations on the part of members of insti-
tutions and bodies. Indeed any perceived lack of integ-
rity within the institutions presents a reputational risk 
not only to the Institutions themselves but also to the 
European project as a whole. 
OLAF’s remit for internal investigations is thus focused 
on alleged serious wrongdoing. While there is no all-en-
compassing definition of serious wrongdoing, OLAF’s 
resources are concentrated on cases where the deploy-
ment of OLAF’s know-how is warranted, just like in ex-
ternal investigations. It must be recalled that such inter-
nal investigations are rare in relative terms since there 
are numerous checks and balances in place to avoid 
fraud and misconduct in the EU Institutions. OLAF also 
works on a constant basis with the EU Institutions and 
bodies to help them detect, prevent and address any 
such possible cases.
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OLAF was informed that a Contracts and 
Finance Officer working for an EU Agency 
had allegedly requested bribes in order to 
apply lower financial penalties to a supplier who had 
been late in delivering IT equipment. The contracted 
company had not delivered a number of laptops 
ordered by the Agency on time, and, according to the 
provisions of the contract, faced potential financial 
consequences. 
OLAF conducted an inspection at the premises 
of the EU Agency, as well as interviewed the person 
concerned, who, shortly after, resigned from his 
position. The investigation uncovered that, on two 
occasions, the Contracts and Finance Officer had 
had unofficial meetings with representatives of the 
IT supplier outside the Agency’s premises – one 
time in a bar and another time in a park. During 
these meetings, the person concerned requested 
side payments in cash, specifically two brown 
envelopes, one containing EUR 20,000 and the 
other 20,000 GBP. In exchange for the bribes, the 
Contract and Finance Officer proposed to reduce 
the amount of financial penalties. However, the 
company came clean and never accepted to pay the 
bribes and fully cooperated with OLAF throughout 
the investigation. 
As a result of its investigation, OLAF issued 
Judicial Recommendations to the relevant national 
Judicial Authorities. 
A. FICTITIOUS EMPLOYMENT AND MISUSE 
OF ALLOWANCES IN THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT
In the field of internal investigations, in recent years 
OLAF has dealt with an increase in the number of cases 
related to the European Parliament. While many of the 
investigations are currently on-going, below you can find 
a sample of the cases concluded in 2016.
These cases typically relate to fictitious employment, 
misuse or fraudulent declaration of allowances, misuse 
of European Parliament funding to support the activi-
ties of national parties, as well as to situations of conflict 
of interest and possible corruption. Such irregularities 
concern MEPs and their assistants, as well as European 
Parliament staff members. 
During a case OLAF concluded in 2016, 
investigators uncovered that a Member 
of the European Parliament committed 
serious irregularities concerning expenses the MEP 
had declared in relation to the employment of his/
her assistants. In one case, OLAF established that 
MEP had produced a purely fictitious work contract 
for a person declared as his/her assistant, even 
though the person never worked for the European 
Parliament. In a second case, an assistant received a 
salary and allowances related to their employment 
in Brussels while, in reality, this person never 
provided any direct assistance to the MEP in the 
offices of the European Parliament as required by 
the rules, and did not actually reside in Brussels 
at all, a condition stipulated in the employment 
contract. Instead, the person lived elsewhere, 
and was not assisting the MEP in his/her duties 
at the European Parliament, but was working for 
the national party. As a result, OLAF sent its final 
report to the European Parliament, recommending 
the recovery of more than EUR 300,000, which 
represented the financial damage OLAF considered 
that the Parliament budget had suffered, as well as 
the launch of disciplinary procedures against one 
of these assistants. In addition, OLAF transmitted 
its final report to the national public prosecutor, 
recommending that judicial proceedings be initiated 
regarding the persons concerned identified by 
the OLAF investigation. Judicial proceedings are 
currently under way.
In another such case concluded in 2016, 
OLAF carried-out an investigation concerning 
the alleged undeclared external activity of 
a Parliamentary Assistant of another MEP. Despite 
the allegations, the OLAF investigation established 
that the assistant had fulfilled the conditions of his 
employment. However, the investigation did reveal 
some procedural shortcomings, and OLAF brought 
these to the attention of the European Parliament. 
The investigation was concluded with a disciplinary 
recommendation.
In addition, on the basis of various investigations, 
OLAF identified certain procedural weaknesses in the 
management and control systems of the European 
Parliament. As a result, in 2016 OLAF issued a number 
of administrative recommendations to the European 
Parliament, in order to address these issues. In 
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particular, OLAF recommended that the Parliament 
provides adequate means to register the presence of 
the Accredited Assistants while in Brussels, Strasbourg 
or on mission, as well as clarifies its guidelines on 
the usage of own devices such as laptops, tablets or 
phones, and that of private emails. Moreover, following 
an investigation into the unauthorised disclosure of an 
OLAF-marked final report, OLAF issued an adminis-
trative recommendation urging the EP to fully protect 
confidential information transmitted in documents 
carrying the official markings of OLAF, to ensure per-
sonal data contained in them is only transferred on a 
need-to-know basis and to reinforce their rules on co-
operating with OLAF. 
Figure 7: Investigations into EU staff and members of the Institutions concluded in 2016
Concluded with recommendations
European Commission 10 8
European External Action Service 7 6
Agencies 7 4
European Parliament 3 2
European Economic and Social Committee 2 2
Council of the European Union 1 0
European Investment Bank 1 1
EULEX 1 0
Court of Justice of the European Union 1 1
European Institute of Innovation and Technology 1 1
Total 34 25
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3. OLAF on the European and 
international scene
3.1. Preventing and fighting revenue 
fraud
In a context of ever more inter-connected global mar-
kets, with international flows of goods and capital, 
OLAF has an important role in preventing and tackling 
fraud affecting the revenue of the EU, mainly customs 
duties. In 2016, the Office delivered significant results 
for the EU budget in this field.
OLAF AT THE HELM OF TRANS-EUROPEAN 
JOINT CUSTOMS OPERATIONS
In addition to its investigations concerning cases of 
revenue fraud, examples of which were presented in 
the previous chapter, OLAF has a crucial role in coordi-
nating large-scale Joint Customs Operations (JCOs) in-
volving EU and international operational partners. JCOs 
are targeted actions of a limited duration that aim to 
combat fraud and the smuggling of sensitive goods in 
specific areas at risk and/or identified trade routes. In 
2016, OLAF co-organised or supported 12 such success-
ful operations. Four of the JCOs organised in coopera-
tion with Member States (Estonia, Finland, Greece and 
the Netherlands) were financed by OLAF:
JCO Magnum was organized at regional level and tar-
geted the smuggling of tobacco products transported 
by road into the EU territory from third countries such 
as Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. The operation was co-
ordinated by the Estonian Customs Administration and 
OLAF with the involvement of five Member States, and 
led to the seizure of around 11 million cigarettes.
JCO Warehouse III targeted the smuggling of excise 
goods, such as mineral oil/fuels, including the usage 
of the duty and tax suspension regimes for fraudu-
lent activities. Coordinated by the Finnish Customs 
Administration and OLAF with the involvement of 
26 Member States and the support of Europol, the 
operation was run from the Permanent Operational 
Coordination Unit at the OLAF premises in Brussels. 
The operation led to the seizure of several thousand 
litres of diesel. 
JCO Orion targeted goods originating from non-EU 
countries and released into free circulation using cus-
toms procedure 42. The operation was coordinated 
by the Hellenic Customs Administration and OLAF 
with the involvement of the customs authorities of 23 
Member States, and in close co-operation with their 
tax authorities. Managed from the OLAF Permanent 
Operational Coordination Unit, with the participation 
of liaison officers and a representative from Europol, 
the JCO led to customs officers uncovering several 
instances of undervaluation and misclassification of 
goods at import, as well as a string of missing traders 
who ‘disappeared’ in order to evade customs duties and 
VAT.
JCO Wafers focused on counterfeit semiconductors 
imported into the EU from China and Hong Kong by 
Post/Express Courier Services. This operation was co-
ordinated by the Dutch Customs and OLAF with the 
involvement of 12 Member States and the support of 
Europol, and in close co-operation with the industry. 
The operation led to the seizure of several hundred 
thousand counterfeit semiconductors, as well as other 
counterfeit products. 
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OLAF’S ANTI-TOBACCO SMUGGLING 
MANDATE
To counter tobacco smuggling into the EU, which caus-
es huge revenue losses to the budgets of the EU and 
of the Member States, OLAF has a unique adminis-
trative investigative mandate in this field. In complex 
cross-border cases in particular, OLAF can bring signifi-
cant added-value by helping coordinate anti-smuggling 
operations carried out by law-enforcement agencies 
across Europe. OLAF works to ensure that evaded du-
ties are recovered, criminal smuggling networks are 
dismantled and perpetrators brought to justice. 
In addition to its operational activities to fight illicit tobac-
co trade, in 2016, OLAF has also been a key contributor 
to the EU becoming a Party to the Protocol to Eliminate 
Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products to the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (“FCTC Protocol”).
A KEY TOOL IN FIGHTING THE ILLICIT 
TOBACCO TRADE – THE FCTC PROTOCOL
The FCTC Protocol is the first international treaty aim-
ing to specifically tackle the illegal trade of tobacco 
products and it was adopted in November 2012. The EU, 
with OLAF as lead service, had a key role in negotiating 
it under the auspices of the World Health Organisation 
(WHO). On 24 June 2016, the EU became a Party to 
the Protocol having deposited the instrument of formal 
confirmation with the United Nations.
The FCTC Protocol is a key policy tool to prevent illicit 
tobacco trade at the international level and is therefore 
becoming the central pillar of the EU’s policy to fight 
this cross-border phenomenon. In addition to acting 
as a deterrent against criminals engaging in the illegal 
tobacco trade, the Protocol will require legislation and 
administrative measures in the Parties enabling them 
to implement core commitments on the control of the 
supply chain of tobacco products. The key provisions 
concern track and trace systems to follow products 
through the supply chain, licensing requirements for 
the production of tobacco products and manufacturing 
equipment, reinforced control in free zones as well as 
provisions on money laundering. This is complement-
ed by other regulatory provisions such as due diligence, 
record keeping (“know-your-customer”), increased 
sanctions, law enforcement co-operation, and mutual 
administrative assistance. 
The FCTC Protocol will only effectively help curbing 
illicit trade if it is also implemented by third coun-
tries which are the main source of illicit tobacco prod-
ucts or are transit countries on the smuggling routes. 
Therefore, the Commission and OLAF are intensifying 
their efforts to promote the Protocol outside the EU.
NEW, POWERFUL TOOLS TO 
COMBAT CUSTOMS FRAUD MADE 
AVAILABLE IN 2016
In 2016, customs investigators across the European 
Union also gained access to new electronic tools to 
combat customs fraud more effectively. Through the 
update of Regulation 515/97, OLAF was empowered 
to create new IT systems which will allow the EU and 
its Member States to better track and trace suspicious 
shipments and thus increase the detection of customs 
fraud. 
Investigators will now be able to access a new Container 
Status Messages directory which gathers messages 
that record the movements of containers transported 
on maritime vessels. The messages are directly provid-
ed by maritime carriers. Similarly, an Import, Export and 
Transit directory has also been developed, containing 
data on goods entering, transiting and leaving the EU. 
Data relating to exports which will be gathered is lim-
ited to sensitive products, such as tobacco, alcohol and 
fuels. As of next year, customs officials as well as OLAF 
officials will also be able to cross-check the information 
from both databases to detect potential fraud patterns. 
These new tools will strengthen the analytical capabil-
ities of national customs authorities and OLAF in de-
tecting fraudulent operations.
Figure 8: Cigarettes seized with the support of OLAF (rounded to million sticks)
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Coordination and investigation cases 156 281 168 602 458
JCOs 0 68 132 17 11
Total 156 349 300 619 469
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The amended legislation will also help speed up OLAF 
investigations by setting out deadlines for Member 
States to provide investigation-related documents. It 
will also facilitate the use of information obtained on 
the basis of mutual assistance as evidence in national 
judicial proceedings.
FIGHTING TRANSHIPMENT 
FRAUD GLOBALLY 
The practice of the illegal transhipment of 
goods in the international Free Zones poses 
a serious problem for the EU because it can 
be used by criminal networks as a concealed 
transport route to bring into the EU illicit 
products and dangerous substances. OLAF is 
working hard to strengthen the co-operation 
with the third countries concerned by creating 
the conditions for an early tracking and 
monitoring system for the most dangerous 
products that could harm the health and safety 
of our citizens and damage our environment. 
OLAF has carried out missions and discussions 
with key international partners throughout 
2016.
3.2. OLAF relations with its partners
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND ANTI-FRAUD 
PROVISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS
Cooperation with third countries with a view to pre-
venting, detecting and combating breaches of customs 
legislation is based on agreements on mutual admin-
istrative assistance in customs matters. Such agree-
ments provide the required legal basis in the context 
of Article 19 of Regulation 515/97 for the exchange of 
information with third countries on fraud or irregulari-
ty. More than 70 agreements are currently in place, in-
cluding with major EU trade partners, like the US, China 
or Japan. In 2016, the list of agreements in force has 
been enlarged with the following partners: Kazakhstan, 
Ivory Coast, Ghana and Kosovo. In addition, negoti-
ations to update the previous agreement have been 
finalised with Armenia. Negotiations with Mercosur 
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) have made 
good progress.
Free trade agreements can contain an anti-fraud clause 
which allows for a temporary withdrawal of tariff pref-
erence for a product in cases of serious customs fraud 
and a persistent lack of adequate cooperation to com-
bat it. OLAF actively contributes to the negotiations on 
this anti-fraud clause. In 2016, the EU made progress in 
on-going negotiations for this clause with Japan, the US, 
Mexico, Mercosur and Tunisia.
ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION 
ARRANGEMENTS WITH INTERNATIONAL 
PARTNERS
Maintaining close relationships with its EU and non-
EU investigative partners is key to OLAF’s success. 
Administrative Cooperation Arrangements (ACAs) can 
play an important role in fostering such relationships. 
In 2016, OLAF continued working towards concluding 
relevant arrangements with its investigative partners. 
To the existing approximately sixty arrangements in 
force at the beginning of the year, OLAF added two 
ACAs with Member States’ authorities5, three ACAs 
with international customs authorities 6, one ACA with 
5 City of London Police and Autorità Nazionale Anti-Corruzione 
from Italy.
6 State Customs Committee of Belarus, Taiwan Bureau of 
Foreign Trade, and Taiwan Customs (revision of an existing 
ACA).
OLAF holds meetings with international partners to help 
eradicate fraud with EU funds
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an international anti-corruption authority 7, one ACA 
with a finance control Body 8 as well as one ACA with an 
international organisation 9 . 
OLAF also concluded two new arrangements with 
EU institutions: one with the European Economic and 
Social Committee (EESC) and one with the European 
Investment Bank (EIB).
Throughout the year, OLAF also “assessed” its stock of 
existing ACAs, with a view to update those that needed 
to be and, ultimately, to be better equipped for future 
joint investigative work with its partners.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR 
COORDINATION OF FRAUD PREVENTION 
(COCOLAF)
OLAF also steers and chairs the Advisory Committee 
for Coordination of Fraud Prevention (COCOLAF) and 
its respective sub-groups, composed of representatives 
of Member States’ authorities. The 2016 annual meet-
ing provided an opportunity to discuss the main devel-
opments in the fight against fraud and the preparation 
of the Article 325 TFEU Report on the ‘Protection of the 
European Union’s financial interests — Fight against 
fraud 2015’.
The COCOLAF subgroups met in 2016 to:
   exchange experience and best practices in anti-
fraud activities; 
  draw up fraud prevention documents under a 
collaborative approach with Member States’ 
experts  coordinated by OLAF such as ‘Guidelines on 
National Anti-Fraud Strategies’;
   prepare guidance on the ‘Irregularity Reporting’ and 
the launch of updated the Irregularity Management 
System (IMS);
  share media strategies and launch communication 
activities on fraud prevention and deterrence.
7 National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine  (NABU).
8 Inspection Generale des Finances (IGF) of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo
9 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).
NATIONAL ANTI-FRAUD STRATEGIES 
Member States are required to put in place efficient 
and proportionate anti-fraud measures for each opera-
tional programme financed or co-financed by the EU for 
the programming period 2014-2020. These anti-fraud 
measures are ideally part of a comprehensive national 
anti-fraud strategy (“NAFS”). OLAF encourages Member 
States to develop such anti-fraud strategies and can pro-
vide support to Member States in the drafting process. 
In 2016 OLAF, with the assistance of Member State ex-
perts, issued updated guidelines on the development of 
NAFS.  Currently, nine Member States (Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta 
and Slovakia) have adopted a NAFS. In 2016, OLAF has 
also advised and assisted Albania, Serbia and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in establishing their 
NAFS. Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries 
must adopt a NAFS for the protection of EU funds as part 
of the accession process.
COOPERATION WITH EUROJUST
In 2016, OLAF and Eurojust organised a training session 
for Eurojust National Members and staff, in order for 
them to better understand OLAF’s mandate and work-
ing methods. Eurojust and OLAF continued to regularly 
exchange information of investigating interest and to 
cooperate on common cases. 
FPDNet
In 2016, OLAF also continued to work on 
fraud prevention training and awareness-
raising activities through the well-established 
Fraud Prevention Network, FPDNet, bringing 
together professionals from Commission 
Services, Executive Agencies and the European 
External Action Service.
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4. Partnering to fight fraud: Monitoring the 
actions taken by the recipients of OLAF 
recommendations 
4.1. Financial monitoring
OLAF INVESTIGATIONS LEAD TO 
HIGH AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED FOR 
RECOVERY TO THE EU BUDGET
Financial recommendations are addressed by OLAF to 
the EU institutions or national authorities providing or 
managing EU funds. The aim of such financial recom-
mendations is to seek the recovery of the defrauded 
EU funds to the EU budget. The sum recommended by 
OLAF for recovery each year depends on the scope and 
scale of the investigations concluded in that given year. 
The amount of recommended recoveries is therefore 
not an indication of the overall fraud level in Europe, 
but relates to specific investigations OLAF has finalised 
in a particular year.
Pursuant to the investigations it concluded in 2016, 
OLAF has recommended the recovery of EUR 631.1 mil-
lion to the EU budget. OLAF is, however, not itself re-
sponsible for the recovery of these funds. It is important 
to note that this money will progressively be recovered 
by the relevant authorities at EU and Member State 
level over the years.  Money can be retrieved from the 
beneficiaries of the funds, national managing authori-
ties or paying agencies in a number of ways, including 
direct recovery, offsetting, deduction, de-commitment, 
programme closure, or clearance of accounts. 
FINANCIAL IMPACT OF OLAF’S 
INVESTIGATIONS IN THE OVERALL 
DETECTION OF IRREGULARITIES ACROSS 
EUROPE
Member States also manage the collection of the EU’s 
customs revenue. Their activities represent the first 
line of defence against any attempt to defraud the EU 
budget. OLAF counts on national authorities to perform 
their work efficiently and diligently, and supports them 
via trainings and though active exchange of information. 
Under sectoral regulations, Member States have to re-
port any irregularity or suspicion of fraud10 they detect 
exceeding EUR 10,000 to the European Commission. 
An analysis of this data is compiled in the Commission’s 
Annual Report on the protection of the EU financial 
interests (the so-called “PIF Report”).
In last year’s OLAF Report 2015, OLAF presented for 
the first time an analysis in the field of Traditional 
Own Resources (TOR), as well as in the area of shared 
management, providing an overview of the number of 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities detect-
ed by national authorities throughout the EU. In this 
year’s edition of the Report, the analysis was extended 
to include 2016 as well. The impact of investigations 
10 A case can be defined as fraud only after a definitive sentence 
is issued by a competent judicial authority. This can take a few 
years following the detection and reporting of the case to the 
Commission.
Figure 9: Amount recommended by 
OLAF for financial recovery in 2016 
(million EUR)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
284.0
402.8
901.0 888.1
631.1
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
29
The OLAF report 2016
is shown as a percentage of the total TOR that au-
thorities have collected for the years 2013-2016 and 
as a percentage of the total payments made under 
the two main areas of shared management11 by each 
Member State. 
In parallel with the Member States, OLAF also gath-
ers data on the number of investigations it has con-
ducted which have led to financial recommendations. 
Alongside the results by national authorities, the re-
sults obtained by OLAF during the same period are 
also published12.
In this analysis, it is assumed that financial recommen-
dations issued by OLAF following investigations are 
comparable to the financial impact of irregularities 
detected and reported by Member States.
Figure 10 shows the number of irregularities/fraud cas-
es detected in the area of Traditional Own Resources 
between 2013 and 2016 and the percentage that their 
financial impact represents in terms of the gross TOR 
collected by Member States and made available to the 
EU budget. OLAF results are shown alongside those of 
national authorities. 
Figure 11 shows the number of fraudulent and non- 
fraudulent irregularities detected in the two main ar-
eas of shared management, namely Structural Funds 
and Agriculture, between 2013-2016 and their financial 
impact expressed as a percentage of the total pay-
ments for the years 2012-201513, divided by Member 
State. OLAF results are shown alongside those of na-
tional authorities.   
11 Namely, Agriculture and Structural Funds.
12 Results by the Member States and OLAF may partially overlap. 
OLAF results are extracted from the Case Management System, 
and represent the total sum of financial recommendations 
issued at the end of the investigations. Data concerning 
Member States is extracted from the Irregularity Management 
System (IMS) for the two expenditure areas and from the 
OWNRES system for TOR. Data used in this report need to 
be considered as provisional as final data are published in the 
‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on the Protection of the European Union’s 
financial interests — Fight against fraud - 2015’ which will be 
published in July 2016.
13 The financial impact of irregularities detected between 2013 
–2016 is compared with payments disbursed between 2012-
2015 as, in the area of expenditure, investigations are very 
rarely related to payments disbursed in the same fiscal year.
Our analysis thus highlights once again the impor-
tant contribution OLAF investigations are making in 
helping the relevant authorities recover EU funds that 
have been defrauded or irregularly misspent. In terms 
of Traditional Own Resources, OLAF financial recom-
mendations would represent 0.49% of the gross TOR 
collected, compared to 2.04% for all Member States 
together. As such, OLAF financial recommendations 
would account for between 19.3% and 23.9%14 of the 
entire financial impact of investigative and control ac-
tivities in the Member States. Compared to the period 
2013-2015, the financial impact of OLAF’s recommen-
dations remained stable, while the financial impact of 
national investigations decreased. While OLAF iden-
tified fewer irregularities than national authorities as 
a whole, their financial impact was, on average, sig-
nificantly larger. This is a testament to OLAF’s com-
mitment to utilising its resources effectively, and thus 
concentrating on cases where its input would bring 
the most value added. 
Comparable results occur also in the shared manage-
ment areas, where the financial impact of the activi-
ties of all Member States together accounts for 2.1% 
of payments, while OLAF alone recommended the 
recovery of 0.43% of payments. In this area, OLAF 
financial recommendations would represent 17.1% to 
20.7% of the entire impact of investigative and control 
activities. There are particular countries, like Hungary, 
where the financial impact of OLAF cases was four 
times higher than that of national investigations. 
Individually analysing the two main areas of shared 
management, OLAF’s impact has been particularly 
significant in relation to the Structural Funds, as its 
financial recommendations represented 0.8% of the 
payments, i.e. between 19% and 23.5% of the financial 
impact of investigative and control activities of the 
Member States, which represents around 3.5% of the 
payments made between 2012 and 2015.  Again, OLAF 
concentrated on large, complex cases, with a high fi-
nancial impact. 
14 The range has been calculated assuming, for the lower limit, 
that OLAF results are not included in those reported by the 
Member States, while for the highest limit, the assumption 
is the opposite - that OLAF results are fully included in those 
reported by the Member States.
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Figure 10: Member State/OLAF detection of irregularities and their financial impact in the area of 
Traditional Own Resources for the period 2013-2016
Traditional Own Resources (TOR)
Member States OLAF
Detected fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent 
irregularities
Financial impact as % 
of TOR collected
Investigations 
closed with 
recommendations
Financial 
recommendations as 
% TOR collected
N % N %
Austria 279 2 .94% 8 0 .14%
Belgium 780 1 .06% 23 0 .77%
Bulgaria 99 3 .65% 15 1 .56%
Croatia 49 1 .69% 0 0 .00%
Cyprus 37 1 .78% 5 0 .08%
Czech Republic 294 2 .14% 15 1 .11%
Denmark 282 1 .68% 13 0 .59%
Estonia 25 1 .58% 7 0 .44%
Finland 156 1 .16% 8 0 .47%
France 1 484 1 .93% 20 0 .31%
Germany 7 316 2 .29% 27 0 .20%
Greece 178 6 .75% 11 0 .18%
Hungary 174 1 .43% 11 0 .38%
Ireland 114 1 .12% 9 0 .42%
Italy 692 1 .52% 23 0 .24%
Latvia 104 5 .56% 8 2 .18%
Lithuania 168 2 .29% 11 1 .23%
Luxembourg 0 0 .00% 0 0 .00%
Malta 14 4 .77% 1 0 .03%
Netherlands 1 808 3 .11% 35 1 .01%
Poland 615 1 .25% 22 1 .03%
Portugal 126 2 .50% 13 1 .60%
Romania 305 4 .05% 22 2 .04%
Slovakia 68 1 .05% 9 0 .25%
Slovenia 45 0 .64% 11 0 .64%
Spain 1 402 2 .33% 24 0 .51%
Sweden 308 0 .98% 11 0 .28%
United Kingdom 4 177 1 .86% 31 0 .32%
Total 21 099 2 .04% 393 0 .49%
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Figure 11: Member State/OLAF detection of irregularities and their financial impact in the areas of 
Structural Funds and Agriculture for the period 2013-2016
Shared Management: Structural Funds and Agriculture
Member States OLAF
Detected fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent 
irregularities
Financial impact as % 
of payments
Investigations 
closed with 
recommendations
Financial 
recommendations as 
% of payments
N % N %
Austria 295 0.34% 2 0.03%
Belgium 327 0.58% 1 0.03%
Bulgaria 720 1.74% 38 0.46%
Croatia 46 0.82% 1 0.01%
Cyprus 72 0.49% 0 0.00%
Czech Republic 3 212 5.49% 5 0.06%
Denmark 193 1.20% 0 0.00%
Estonia 346 1.39% 0 0.00%
Finland 125 0.09% 0 0.00%
France 1 039 0.33% 5 0.01%
Germany 1 623 0.37% 6 0.09%
Greece 1 505 2.23% 10 0.35%
Hungary 2 442 1.22% 41 4.16%
Ireland 1 325 3.14% 0 0.00%
Italy 3 016 1.63% 15 0.25%
Latvia 580 3.30% 1 0.01%
Lithuania 896 3.00% 3 0.08%
Luxembourg 1 0.12% 0 0.00%
Malta 80 2.28% 1 0.50%
Netherlands 726 2.03% 1 0.00%
Poland 4 731 1.60% 13 0.07%
Portugal 1 703 1.21% 7 0.24%
Romania 4 857 5.65% 99 0.68%
Slovakia 1 360 13.14% 14 2.55%
Slovenia 239 2.00% 1 0.14%
Spain 9 766 2.98% 5 0.49%
Sweden 207 0.82% 0 0.00%
United Kingdom 2 610 0.89% 5 0.05%
Total 44 042 2.10% 274 0.43%
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4.2.  Judicial monitoring
Ever since its creation, OLAF has been monitoring the 
actions taken by national judicial authorities following 
its judicial recommendations, in order to see the out-
come of these cases on the ground and find out if they 
have led to indictments or to other judicial measures.
A recent analysis OLAF conducted into the national 
judicial outcomes for the last seven years confirms the 
results from the previous period, namely that around 
half of the cases submitted by OLAF to national judi-
cial authorities have led to indictments. While judicial 
authorities are of course independent, and while the 
legal architecture may vary at Member State level, 
OLAF has continuously strived to understand the rea-
sons why national judiciaries dismiss part of the cases 
it sends them. Therefore, OLAF carried out a detailed 
exercise with several Member States in 2014, 2015 and 
2016 successively.
While it is not for OLAF to question the validity of na-
tional prosecutors’ decisions to dismiss individual cas-
es on particular grounds, OLAF’s analysis confirms the 
argument in support of the Commission’s proposal for 
a European Public Prosecutor’s Office. First of all it ap-
pears that art. 11§2 of Regulation 883/2013, and prior to 
that, art. 9§2 of Regulation 1073/1999 which was iden-
tical, is not a sufficient legal basis to allow all Member 
States’ judicial authorities to use OLAF reports as evi-
dence in trial. Therefore, in numerous Member States, 
after receiving the OLAF final report, prosecutors carry 
out all the investigation activities once again in order to 
acquire admissible evidence. 
Sometimes, despite great investigative efforts de-
ployed by the Office, its limited investigation powers 
and practical possibilities do not allow it to collect 
strong evidence of a criminal offence.
As regards internal investigations, whereas for OLAF 
any infringement committed by EU staff is regarded as 
a very serious matter, irrespective of the prejudice to 
the EU budget, the priorities of the national judiciaries 
may be different.
Finally, some of the cases analysed show differences of 
interpretation of EU and national law between OLAF 
and national authorities. OLAF started in 2016 to ad-
dress these differences, through bilateral meetings with 
the relevant judicial authorities. 
Overall, the exercise covered all Member States with 
the exception of Croatia where OLAF did not issue any 
judicial recommendations, and of Malta and Slovenia, 
where no cases submitted by OLAF were dismissed. 
The results of the exercise carried out by OLAF were 
discussed in the annual Interinstitutional Exchange of 
Views, as well as at a meeting with all the national an-
tifraud coordination services (AFCOS), in 2016. 
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Figure 12: Actions taken by national judicial authorities (JA) following OLAF’s recommendations issued 
between 1 January 2009 and December 2016
Member state No decision taken 
by JA (*)
Decision taken by JA Indictment 
rateTotal Dismissed Indictment
Austria 3 5 2 3 60%
Belgium 9 36 17 19 53%
Bulgaria 13 22 12 10 45%
Croatia 2 0 0 0 NA
Cyprus 2 3 2 1 33%
Czech Republic 3 6 4 2 33%
Denmark 2 3 2 1 33%
Estonia 1 1 0 1 100%
Finland 2 1 1 0 0%
France 8 9 4 5 56%
Germany 15 19 13 6 32%
Greece 13 10 2 8 80%
Hungary 22 9 6 3 33%
Ireland 1 2 2 0 0%
Italy 25 30 11 19 63%
Latvia 2 2 2 0 0%
Lithuania 3 7 4 3 43%
Luxembourg 6 4 3 1 25%
Malta 3 4 4 100%
Netherlands 11 4 3 1 25%
Poland 9 11 2 9 82%
Portugal 10 5 4 1 20%
Romania 28 74 50 24 32%
Slovakia 5 9 7 2 22%
Slovenia 3 1 0 1 100%
Spain 12 16 10 6 38%
Sweden 1 2 1 1 50%
United Kingdom 19 13 7 6 46%
Grand Total 233 308 171 137 44%
Grand Total without SAPARD (**) 233 246 123 123 50%
(*) In the category of no decision taken, we include also those cases that are still in the so-called “reporting period”. When OLAF 
sends a judicial recommendation to a Member State, the competent authority has to report on the actions taken following the 
recommendation within 12 months.
(**) OLAF’s overall caseload in Bulgaria and Romania includes a large number of older investigations involving the misuse of SAPARD 
funds. SAPARD-related cases have led to a relatively low rate of judicial indictment. This was mainly due to the widespread use of 
consultants and agents in preparing aid applications and tender documents, which raised doubts at judicial level about the fraudulent 
intent of the beneficiaries. In both countries, the indictment rate of non-SAPARD cases is higher.
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4.3. Disciplinary monitoring
EU INSTITUTIONS TAKE ACTION TO 
FOLLOW-UP ON OLAF’S INTERNAL 
INVESTIGATIONS
The Disciplinary Recommendations issued by OLAF 
concern misconduct of EU staff or members of the EU 
Institutions and are directed at the authority having 
disciplinary powers in the Institution concerned. The 
appointing authorities sometimes take several actions 
following a single recommendation from OLAF. At the 
same time, the appointing authority may join several 
recommendations resulting from different investiga-
tions and, subsequently, impose one single sanction. 
Figure 13: Actions taken by the appointing authorities following OLAF’s Disciplinary Recommendations 
issued between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2016
Recipient of recommendation Total No decision 
taken (*)
Decision taken
No case is made Action taken
Agencies 9 4 3 2
Court of Justice 2 1 1 0
European Commission 20 4 5 11
European Economic and Social Committee 2 1 1 0
European External Action Service 4 1 0 3
European Investment Bank 2 1 0 1
European Parliament 9 3 1 5
Total 48 15 11 22
(*) In the category of no decision taken, we include also those cases that are still in the so-called “reporting period”. When OLAF sends 
a disciplinary recommendation to an appointing authority, the competent authority has to report on the actions taken following the 
recommendation within 6 months.
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5. Focus chapter: OLAF and innovation
OLAF has made significant investment and deployed 
substantial efforts in the last years to use and promote 
the most innovative investigative techniques and tools. 
OLAF has matched its unique investigative mandate 
with innovative state of the art investigative tools in or-
der to continue to remain at the forefront of the global 
fight against fraud. In this year’s Report, OLAF is plac-
ing in the spotlight some of its most important initia-
tives in this field, undertaken in 2016.
5.1. A premiere of 2016: OLAF’s 
extensive analysis of the 
“Panama Papers”
In its investigative activities, OLAF generally uses all 
open source information available. For instance, OLAF’s 
text mining and analysis capabilities are, at this point, 
almost unparalleled in Europe for an administrative 
body. When the Panama Papers were published, OLAF 
experts quickly realised that the documents could bring 
interesting leads in the fight against fraud and corrup-
tion, and that they had the necessary tools to process 
the huge data volume. OLAF therefore downloaded the 
Panama Papers public database, which contained al-
most 430,000 entities – persons and companies. With 
its highly-developed analytical tools, OLAF examined 
the large amount of available data. The first step, which 
took 11 days, was “cleaning” the data, whereby OLAF an-
alysts fixed any possible inconsistencies. A Slavic name, 
for example, when translated from the Cyrillic alphabet 
to the Latin alphabet could be spelled in different ways, 
although it relates to the same person. Experts identi-
fied such instances, thus making the data more relia-
ble. Experts then checked whether the following three 
categories had in any way been linked to the offshore 
companies exposed in the Panama Papers.
The first category related to EU staff who held man-
agerial functions (European Commission Directors-
General, Directors or Executive Directors of all EU 
Decentralized Agencies), to members of the European 
Institutions (the current Members of the European 
Parliament, the Juncker and Barroso II Commissions) 
and to staff categories across the European Institutions 
considered to be at higher risk, for example budget 
administrators, procurement officers, inspectors, 
investigators or auditors. The second category consist-
ed of experts providing services in the course of EU 
projects and beneficiaries of EU funds, while the third 
category comprised persons or entities that had been 
involved in OLAF closed or on-going investigations.
Overall, OLAF identified around 40,000 persons and 
companies pertaining to these three categories. The 
data was imported into iBase, a database that helped 
OLAF analysts identify persons, companies and their 
relationships. The software automatically flagged iden-
tical matches and semi-automatic “near matches” based 
on spelling variations.
The analytical exercise undertaken by OLAF result-
ed in 17 real matches, a very number low compared to 
the large number of individuals and companies OLAF 
cross-referenced, and a positive sign attesting to the 
integrity of EU staff and members. On the basis of this 
analysis and of information also related to the Panama 
Papers but obtained from other sources, OLAF then 
opened four investigations.
The purpose of the analysis was not only to uncover any 
fraud against the EU budget or serious misconduct of 
EU staff and members, but to also identify any system-
ic vulnerability in European Commission programmes, 
with a view to correcting it. 
5.2. The IDCP platform: 
cross-matching across borders 
In June 2016, OLAF joined forces with the World Bank 
Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) by signing an arrange-
ment to set up an Investigative Data Cross-Matching 
Platform (IDCP). This arrangement marks a new step in 
the longstanding and successful cooperation between 
the two bodies and deepens international cooperation 
in the fight against fraud by creating a database to sup-
port the exchange of investigative information.
The IDCP facilitates the exchange of case-related 
information between OLAF and INT, helping the two 
partners  identify cases of double or multiple funding 
of development projects, as well as identical persons 
or economic operators defrauding their respective 
budgets.
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The innovative feature of the IDCP is that once data 
has been uploaded into the system, it will automatically 
identify “cross-matches” such as the name of the same 
economic operator or of the same persons in the OLAF 
and INT investigations, and will automatically notify the 
two investigative bodies.
Cross-matches are done in full compliance with 
the European Data Protection Supervisor’s (EDPS) 
recommendations. 
5.3. OLAF Operational Analysis and 
Digital Forensic activities
A dedicated OLAF Operational Analysis and Digital 
Forensic Unit is providing highly specialised technical 
assistance and analytical support to OLAF investiga-
tors. Assistance is focussed on complex investigations, 
both with respect to the content or the high volume of 
data. The Unit is composed of highly experienced and 
certified digital forensic examiners and analysts who 
are trained to find evidence wherever data/information 
has been stored, hidden or even deleted.
The Unit applies expert skills and state of the art tools 
to acquire, handle, process and analyse large amount 
of data and information in order to extract, interpret 
and present evidence useful in OLAF investigations. 
Moreover, the team works on a fully integrated plat-
form of forensic data extraction, deep full text search, 
text mining, content analysis, audio search, multi-media 
analysis and advanced data visualisation.
The combination of these tools together with the ex-
pertise in handling and analysing huge volume of data 
and information make this Unit an essential and valua-
ble support to OLAF investigative operations on com-
plex investigations.
OLAF also assists its partners in the Member States 
and in the European Commission by providing techni-
cal, analytical and forensics support for their investiga-
tive operational activities (e.g. in the context of Joint 
Customs Operations) or facilitating and enhancing 
the audit risk analysis methods of the Commission’s 
Directorates-General.
Not only does OLAF’s Operational Analysis and Digital 
Forensic team offer assistance to national law en-
forcement authorities, it also shares its expertise with 
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Member States and International Organisations by 
providing analytical support for developing intelligence 
based solutions, and technical assistance or training for 
their capacity-building in forensic procedures and in de-
tecting methods of fraud.
Thanks to such collaboration between OLAF and its 
partners, the prosecution of corruption and fraud cases 
has been facilitated in many countries.
OLAF management is committed to constantly pro-
viding OLAF investigators with new tools and with the 
necessary support to take on large, complex, cross-bor-
der fraud investigations. It is only through acquiring or 
developing such tools in-house that OLAF can stay one 
step ahead of the game and identify increasingly pro-
fessionalised fraudsters. 
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6. Policies to fight fraud
In addition to its investigative work, as a European 
Commission service, OLAF plays an active role in the 
development of EU anti-fraud policies. The Office is 
regularly at the forefront of drafting and negotiating 
legislative texts concerning the protection of the 
EU’s financial interests against fraud and corruption. 
It is thanks to its solid investigative expertise, that 
OLAF can support the EU institutions in furthering 
a sound legal framework that offers ever-improved 
protection to the EU budget and to taxpayers’ mon-
ey. The main projects on which OLAF experts have 
made significant efforts in 2016 are summarised in 
this chapter.
PIF DIRECTIVE:  
AGREEMENT REACHED IN LATE 2016
In 2016, the European legislators continued negotia-
tions on the proposed Directive on the fight against 
fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of 
criminal law (so-called “PIF directive”). The aim of the 
proposal is to harmonise definitions of offences, sanc-
tion levels and prescription periods for EU fraud and 
related crimes. The main open issue for discussion in 
the course of 2016 was whether VAT fraud should or 
should not come within the scope of the Directive. An 
agreement was reached between the co-legislators in 
November 2016. Under this agreement, cases of se-
rious VAT offences are included in the scope of the 
Directive when they involve a damage of at least EUR 
10 million. The formal adoption of the Directive by the 
Council and the European Parliament is scheduled to 
take place in 2017. 
THE LONG ROAD TO ESTABLISHING 
A EUROPEAN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Decisive progress was made on the Commission pro-
posal for the establishment of a European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (“EPPO”) in 2016 under the Dutch 
and the Slovak Presidencies. At the same time, Sweden 
announced at the December Justice and Home Affairs 
Council that it would not participate at this stage in 
the EPPO. Discussions will continue under the Maltese 
Presidency. In the absence of unanimity, a large num-
ber of Member States decided at the beginning of 2017 
to establish the EPPO under an enhanced cooperation 
procedure. The Parliament – which will need to give its 
consent to the Council for the EPPO to be established 
– has reiterated its support for the creation of an inde-
pendent and efficient EPPO in a Resolution adopted in 
October 2016. 
OLAF will work closely with the EPPO as it is being set 
up, in order to allow it to benefit to a maximum from 
OLAF’s practical experience in the fight against fraud 
affecting EU funds. Once the EPPO is operational, 
both bodies will need to establish a close partnership 
for the exchange of information and collaboration on 
investigations.
IMPLEMENTATION OF  
THE HERCULE III PROGRAMME 
OLAF is responsible for the management of the 
Hercule III Programme which mainly supports actions 
and projects that aim to protect the financial interests 
of the European Union. The Programme has a budget 
of more than EUR 100 million for the period 2014-
2020. It is implemented on the basis of annual work 
programmes setting out the budget and the funding 
priorities for a given calendar year. The annual work 
programme for 2016 made available a budget of EUR 
14.5 million for the purchase of, for example, special-
ised technical equipment by law enforcement agen-
cies in the Member States, such as customs or police 
forces. The financial support was used for the pur-
chase of a wide range of equipment, such as scanners 
used in harbours or airports, digital forensic soft- and 
hardware or the purchase and training of sniffer dogs. 
For example Greek customs obtained remarkable re-
sults with their “Cigarette Detector Dogs” which re-
cently helped seize more than 250 million cigarettes 
and 500kg tobacco.
The technical equipment purchased with grants from 
the Hercule III Programme in 2016 was already found 
to have improved the quantity and quality of informa-
tion customs authorities gathered on individuals and 
organisations suspected of involvement in smuggling. 
The equipment led to a better understanding of the 
methods deployed by organised crime, which con-
tributed in 2016 to important seizures of cigarettes, 
tobacco or to the detection of money laundering and 
VAT evasion. 
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This was the third year of the implementation of the 
Hercule III programme and the first tangible results of 
the activities funded since 2014 started becoming avail-
able in 2016. These results demonstrate the substantial 
contribution with the Programme’s financial support to 
the protection of the Union’s financial interests.
The Hercule III Programme also supported conferenc-
es, seminars and training events attended by staff of 
national administrations, law enforcement agencies 
and NGOs in order to strengthen mutual cooperation, 
staff exchanges or the exchange of best practices in 
the protection of the Union’s financial interests. The 
Programme funded digital forensic training sessions 
aimed at improving the skills of its participants to se-
cure evidence from digital devices in a rapidly evolving 
technological environment and helping them to stay in 
the forefront of the fight against fraud.  
EVALUATION OF THE  
OLAF REGULATION NO 883/2013
The exercise of OLAF’s mandate to investigate fraud 
and any other illegal activity affecting the EU finan-
cial interests and to help Member States fight fraud 
is governed by Regulation No. 883/2013, the so-called 
“OLAF Regulation”, in force since 2013. Article 19 of 
the Regulation provides that “by 2 October 2017, the 
Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and 
the Council an evaluation report on the application of this 
Regulation. That report shall be accompanied by an opin-
ion of the Supervisory Committee and shall state whether 
there is a need to amend this Regulation.” 
The evaluation work which already started in 2015 with 
the help of an external contractor is an important ex-
ercise intended to ensure that the legal framework for 
OLAF investigations is fit for purpose. It will provide rec-
ommendations for any future revision of the Regulation 
if shortcomings of the legislative framework and its im-
plementation are identified. The report will look in par-
ticular at the effectiveness of OLAF’s investigative tools, 
the procedural guarantees for persons concerned laid 
down in Regulation 883/2013, OLAF’s governance and its 
relations with its partners. The evaluation will not only 
consider the status quo, but will also be forward looking. 
It will assess any necessary adaptations to OLAF’s frame-
work in order to clarify OLAF’s relationship and added 
value vis-à-vis the European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
and, more generally, its role in a changing anti-fraud land-
scape. The evaluation will thus allow the Commission to 
identify any possible need to adapt OLAF’s mandate and 
tools to current needs and challenges in the area of fraud. 
In March 2017, a first evaluation conference was held in 
Brussels. In his remarks, OLAF Director-General Giovanni 
Kessler advocated the need for reform. “The evaluation 
of Regulation 883 offers us an important opportunity,” 
Mr. Kessler said. “Not only can we see what worked and 
what should be improved, it gives us the possibility to tru-
ly reflect on the future of OLAF and assess whether the 
current OLAF model is still good enough to cater for the 
overall protection of the EU’s financial interests.” In re-
lation to the issues emerging from the evaluation, the 
OLAF Director-General put forward a number of areas 
that should be considered for a possible revision of the 
Regulation. In particular, he called for better tools to 
allow the Office to perform the investigative acts nec-
essary in the fight against fraud. He also suggested that 
an amended Regulation should consider a sufficient legal 
basis to allow judicial authorities in all EU Member States 
to use OLAF reports as evidence in trial. Given OLAF’s 
unique investigative mandate, he invited participants to 
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consider possible new areas to further develop OLAF’s 
competences. 
National-level experts joined academics, lawyers 
and EU civil servants in lively discussions on the key 
provisions of the Regulation and their application in the 
context of current and emerging fraud trends. Results 
of the conference will feed into the evaluation report 
on the application of the Regulation 883/2013 that will 
be finalised in 2017.
As part of the evaluation process, European 
Commissioner for Budget and Human 
Resources, Günther H. Oettinger, joined 
more than 200 stakeholders at a high-level 
conference on 1-2 March 2017 in Brussels. 
“I can only commend OLAF for its impressive 
work in protecting the EU budget and helping 
ensure that citizens’ money goes towards 
projects that improve the lives of all Europeans,” 
Commissioner Oettinger said. “Now it’s time 
to look to the future and to try to make sure 
that OLAF has the tools it needs to successfully 
counter increasingly sophisticated forms of fraud,” 
he added.
Commissioner for Budget & Human Resources Günther Oettinger at the Conference 
on the evaluation of Regulation 883/2013, in March 2017
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7. Relations with the Supervisory Committee
The Supervisory Committee of OLAF is a body of five 
independent outside experts, established to reinforce 
and guarantee OLAF’s independence by regularly moni-
toring the implementation of OLAF’s investigative func-
tion. The Committee delivers Opinions to the Director-
General of OLAF and reports to the EU institutions.
The Supervisory Committee members are appointed by 
common agreement of the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission. Regulation 883/2013 pro-
vides for a staggered renewal of the SC Members to en-
sure continuity in the Committee. In 2016, the European 
institutions established a new list of Members, as well as 
a reserve list for the Supervisory Committee. Two new 
members, Ms Drinan (IE) and Ms Stronikowska (PL), 
started their mandate mid-2016, replacing Mr Pöysti 
and Mr Bösch. The remaining three members of the SC, 
Ms Pignon, Mr Denolf and Mr Zimianitis were replaced 
in January 2017 by Ms Fazenda (PT), Mr Klement (CZ) 
and Mr Mulder (NL). Since March 2017, Mr Mulder is 
the Chair of the Committee, replacing Ms Drinan in this 
function.
In line with Regulation 883/2013, the Members are 
supported by a Secretariat. As of 1 January 2017, fol-
lowing an amendment of Regulation 883/2013, the 
Supervisory Committee Secretariat is no longer provid-
ed by OLAF, but by the Commission. It was decided by 
the Commission to attach the Secretariat staff to the 
Commission’s Pay Master Office (PMO).
The Director-General of OLAF keeps the Supervisory 
Committee regularly informed of the Office’s activities, 
implementation of its investigative function, and action 
taken by way of follow-up to investigations. In 2016, in 
accordance with the Regulation 883/2013 and the work-
ing arrangements between OLAF and the Supervisory 
Committee, OLAF transmitted to the Committee 
562 documents with information on cases lasting more 
than 12 months. OLAF informed the Committee of 
266 recommendations, issued between 16 October 2015 
and 15 October 2016, as a result of OLAF’s investiga-
tions, and a further 67 instances in which information 
was transmitted to judicial authorities of the Member 
States. Staff of the Committee’s Secretariat also had 
full access to 62 case files in OLAF’s case management 
system.
In 2016, the Supervisory Committee delivered two 
Opinions to the Director-General, one on OLAF Draft 
Investigation Policy Priorities for the year 2016, and one 
on OLAF’s Preliminary Draft Budget for 2017, to which 
OLAF has replied on 12 May 2016 and on 13 January 2017 
respectively.
In its Opinions, the Supervisory Committee issues rec-
ommendations to the Director-General. OLAF reports 
annually to the Committee on the state of implemen-
tation of its recommendations, the last time on 16 
February 2017, concerning all recommendations issued 
in 2016. 
Details of the Committee’s work can be found in its an-
nual activity report. This report and OLAF’s responses, 
as well as other information, are publicly available on 
OLAF’s website.
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8. Data protection, legality checks 
and complaints
PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA IS 
CRUCIAL TO OLAF’S WORK 
The protection of personal data contributes to the 
overall success of OLAF’s investigative function as it 
safeguards the rights of individuals during all the stag-
es of the life of an OLAF case. Ever since the creation 
of OLAF as an independent body, the Office has its 
own data protection officer (DPO) who ensures that 
OLAF implements the requirements of Regulation 
45/2001 on the protection of personal data, includ-
ing the recommendations of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS). The decisions and rec-
ommendations of the EDPS have a significant impact 
on how OLAF carries out its investigative activities, 
such as on-the-spot checks or the forensic examina-
tion of digital devices. 
More than 2800 relevant data subjects have been list-
ed in the numerous cases opened by OLAF between 
2012- 2016 and the investigative units in charge have 
taken the relevant measures to provide them with a 
data protection privacy statement as soon as possible. 
In 2016, OLAF concluded several new Administrative 
Cooperation Arrangements (ACAs) which cover trans-
fers of personal data with partners in non-EU coun-
tries and international organisations. Data protection 
clauses, based on a model established in consultation 
with the EDPS, were included in all of these ACAs.  A 
specific arrangement was concluded between OLAF 
and the World Bank Integrity Vice-Presidency  to 
launch the investigative Data cross –Matching plat-
form marking a new step in the two bodies’ successful 
cooperation, with the authorisation of the EDPS (see 
special focus chapter on innovation in this Report).
During 2016, OLAF received a total of 10 requests from 
data subjects for access to their personal data. All of 
these requests have been handled within the legally 
foreseen deadlines.  
OLAF GUARANTEES PROPORTIONALITY 
OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTS, AND 
SAFEGUARDS THE RIGHTS OF DEFENCE
The OLAF Director-General has put in place an internal 
advisory and control procedure to ensure the compli-
ance of OLAF investigations with EU and national law, 
as well as the respect of procedural guarantees and fun-
damental rights of the persons involved in OLAF cas-
es. The responsible team within unit 0.1, composed of 
OLAF staff with legal and prosecutorial experience in 
various Member States, conducts legality checks during 
OLAF’s investigations, as well as legal reviews before 
cases are concluded.
The internal advisory and control review allows the 
Office to benefit from an ex ante control as regards the 
legality check of the investigative activities requiring 
the authorisation of the Director General, ensures the 
overall quality and conformity of the investigative ac-
tivities to the applicable rules, and helps improves the 
final case reports, the decisions on closure and the rec-
ommendations issued by OLAF.
Furthermore, the control of the respect of national pro-
visions ensures that the final OLAF case reports consti-
tute admissible, credible and valuable evidence in the 
course of administrative and criminal proceedings in 
the Member States concerned.
OLAF RECEIVES VERY LOW NUMBER OF 
COMPLAINTS ON ITS INVESTIGATIVE 
ACTIVITY
Persons affected by an OLAF investigation may address 
a complaint directly to OLAF. The possibility to make a 
complaint to the Director-General of OLAF is without 
prejudice to the citizen¹s right to lodge a complaint with 
the European Ombudsman or to raise issues related to 
OLAF investigations before the European Courts.
In 2016, the Director-General received six complaints 
from persons involved in OLAF investigations about 
issues relating to the handling of their procedural guar-
antees. In five of these complaints, the complainants 
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received a substantiated reply within the two months’ 
deadline in accordance with the established procedures.
Officials and other EU staff may also complain to OLAF 
under Article 90a of the Staff Regulations against any 
act adversely affecting them in connection with OLAF 
investigations. In 2016, OLAF received two complaints 
in which Article 90a of the Staff Regulations was in-
voked. After examining them in accordance with the 
established procedure, OLAF concluded that they did 
not satisfy the conditions foreseen in Article 90a and 
replied to the complainants accordingly. 
In 2016, the European Ombudsman opened two inquiries 
in relation to complaints involving OLAF, both of which 
were closed in the course of the year. The first com-
plaint concerned a public access to documents request, 
where the Ombudsman concluded that OLAF was enti-
tled to refuse access. The second complaint concerned 
an alleged failure to reply to the complainant’s corre-
spondence. Following the Ombudsman’s intervention, 
OLAF settled the issue by replying to the complainant 
and apologising for the delay. In the course of 2016, the 
Ombudsman also concluded seven inquiries concerning 
OLAF that had been opened in previous years. Two of 
these inquiries concerned OLAF’s investigative activity, 
two were about requests for access to documents, one 
concerned an alleged failure to reply to correspondence, 
one concerned the processing of personal data and one 
was related to the inclusion of a company in the Early 
Warning System (EWS). All seven inquiries were closed 
either without a finding of maladministration, or be-
cause OLAF had already settled the matter.  
Issues related to OLAF investigations were also raised 
before the European Courts in a very limited number 
of cases. Usually, this occurs in the context of litigation 
against measures taken by the Commission or other 
institutions, bodies or agencies based on OLAF recom-
mendations, such as financial recovery or disciplinary 
procedures. It may also occur in the context of an ac-
tion for damages caused by OLAF. This was the case in 
T-483/13 Oikonomopoulos v. Commission, where the 
General Court reviewed a broad range of procedural 
steps carried out by OLAF. In its judgement of 2016 the 
General Court confirmed OLAF’s competence to carry 
out investigative activities. In particular, it upheld the 
opening of the investigation, the conduct of the on-the-
spot checks the conduct of interviews, the timing and 
duration of the investigation and respect of the rights of 
defence of the person concerned.
In July 2016, the European Court of Justice 
confirmed in a judgment that OLAF 
investigative procedures respect the 
fundamental right to protection of personal 
data as well as the rights of defence15. 
15 Judgment of the General court 20 July 2016, T -483/13.
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9. Staff and Budget 
Staff and budget
The number of OLAF staff members has declined in 
2016 by 1.7%, in the context of the general reductions in 
staff and budgets in the EU public service. At the end of 
2016, the total number16 of staff members and available 
vacancies in OLAF stood at 415. Despite the staff cuts, 
OLAF managed to maintain the relative share of staff 
allocated to the fight against fraud at 78.3% and to an-
ti-fraud policy work at 12.3%. The remaining 9.4% were 
allocated to overhead functions such as HR, finance 
and ICT infrastructure management. 
So far OLAF has coped with the combination of a 
structural increase in workload and reduction in staff 
numbers through efficiency gains. Indeed, a number of 
organisational changes were introduced since 2012 to 
streamline support functions and processes, improve 
the distribution of responsibilities and competences, 
and reduce non-core activities, overheads and adminis-
trative burdens. These changes have improved the effi-
ciency of investigations, despite the additional notifica-
tion duties and legality checks imposed by Regulation 
883/2013. 
16 Officials, temporary agents, contract agents, seconded 
national experts and interim staff employed on 31/12/2016; 
excluding trainees and external service providers.
OLAF increasingly requires staff with a wide range 
of skills, training and professional backgrounds. Also, 
OLAF needs to be able to function and investigate in 
all EU languages. OLAF’s staff profile in 2016 met the 
necessary standards. However, the challenges which 
OLAF faces in maintaining its current level of profes-
sional expertise go beyond the budgetary restrictions 
outlined above. OLAF will have to renew its ageing 
workforce, as investigative staff recruited from nation-
al services in the early days of the Office retire, and 
will have to manage the increasing demand from other 
Commission services and EU bodies for staff with the 
skills and background of OLAF professionals. With a 
view to anticipating these challenges, actions taken 
under the OLAF HR Strategic Plan in 2016 included: 
  Launching two competitions in the investigative 
field for administrators to compensate the loss 
of expertise OLAF is facing due to the ageing of 
its staff and the expiry of many temporary agent 
contracts. Reserve lists, which should be published 
by in the last semester of 2017, will include 25 
investigators with expertise in EU expenditure and 
anti-corruption, 15 investigators with experience 
Figure 14: Number and breakdown of OLAF staff from 2009 to 2016
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in customs and trade, tobacco and counterfeit 
goods, as well as 10 investigators able to take up the 
function of team leaders.                                 
  Continuous investment in the professionalisation 
of its staff through internal investigative training, 
external trainings and coaching.
  The sharing of knowledge and enhancing  the 
communication within the organisation, via 
lunchtime debates and team building actions 
focusing on work related issues that have a direct 
impact on the  teams’ effectiveness. 
  Communicating on OLAF’s activities and 
contributing to a positive image of the Office by 
giving trainings and presentations to stakeholders 
outside the Office, as well as organising visits within 
OLAF premises. 
Figure 15: OLAF’s administrative budget in 2016 (million EUR)
EU staff 40.5
Infrastructure 6.7
ICT 5
External agents (contract staff, seconded national experts and interims) 2.6
Missions 1.7
Anti-fraud measures 1.9
Training, meetings and committees 0.5
Total 58.9
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Figure 16: Organisational chart
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10. Communication
WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT FRAUD
In recent years, OLAF has placed great emphasis on 
clearly and coherently communicating with its stake-
holders and the public to explain the contribution it 
brings to the EU budget and the European project more 
generally. In its dual capacity as independent investi-
gative body which also acts as a Directorate-General 
of the European Commission in developing anti-fraud 
policies, OLAF strives to be as open and as transparent 
as possible with the media and the public, while also 
protecting the confidentiality of  investigations. To 
manage the communication on investigative matters 
independently from any other institution, OLAF has its 
own Spokesperson team who communicates to the me-
dia on matters linked to its investigative mandate.  
Constantly looking for new ways to reach European 
citizens, and to raise awareness of the importance of 
fighting fraud with EU funds, in 2016, OLAF focused 
on both increasing its communication output, and di-
versifying the channels through which it reaches its 
audience. Communication actions were geared towards 
developing and maintaining a positive relationship with 
journalists in Brussels and beyond, with the end goal of 
both informing our readers on why enforcing a policy 
of zero tolerance to fraud is essential, and empowering 
them to take an active stance in fraud prevention and 
deterrence. OLAF organised or participated in several 
press conferences and events, on issues ranging from 
the launch of the OLAF annual report, to customs fraud 
or cigarette smuggling. It partnered with national law 
enforcement institutions in order to present cross-Eu-
ropean case studies (e.g. press event with Belgian 
Customs in December 2016). 
In an attempt to better engage directly with its audi-
ence, in 2016 OLAF has become active on Twitter. This 
has helped the Office get closer to its audience, as well 
as engage with partner anti-fraud services, showcasing 
their work and achievements. Our guest-posting exer-
cises developed with OLAF partner institutions, such 
as the Belgian and Latvian Ministries of Finance or the 
Dutch Customs and helped spread the word about the 
need to take action against fraud and corruption. 
Throughout 2016, OLAF also continued to be the cen-
tral point of the OAFCN, the OLAF Network of Anti-
Fraud Communicators, which was created over a dec-
ade ago and is a unique cross-European network of 
communication experts working on anti-fraud issues. 
The Network brings together Communication Officers 
and Spokespersons from OLAF’s operational partners 
in the Member States. It plays a pivotal role in commu-
nicating the threat of fraud to the public, as well as the 
joint efforts made by national and European authorities 
to combat it. It is a key platform for raising awareness 
and reaching out to various audiences on fraud issues. 
OLAF also engaged in joint actions with other European 
Commission services, supporting the EU Budget 
Focused on Results initiative of the Directorate-General 
for Budget, for example, as well as presenting its work 
at the yearly Open Day of the European Institutions.
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11. Outlook by the Director-General of OLAF
It has been almost seven years since I took over the posi-
tion of OLAF Director-General. Moving to Brussels was 
not a difficult decision. As a former prosecutor, I was 
passionate about fighting fraud, while my strong belief 
in the values of the European Union made me embrace 
the role of a dedicated EU civil servant. Though I knew 
it would be a unique and challenging position, this was a 
challenge I both looked forward to, and welcomed.
With the end of my mandate in sight, I am proud to 
have had the opportunity to work alongside excellent 
colleagues, who supported me in steering the Office 
through an extensive reorganisation, one that helped 
OLAF work better, faster and more efficiently. I took 
over the management of OLAF at a turning point, and 
saw it transform into a modern investigative body, able 
to solve even the most complex, cross-border, fraud cas-
es. Our results over the last years speak for themselves 
– several thousand large-scale investigations completed 
and recommendations issued, with several billion euros 
recommended for recovery, all in an ever shorter time 
frame and with no staff increase. With the support of 
my colleagues, we not only took on high profile internal 
and external investigations, but we did our work thor-
oughly and with great determination, while maintaining 
an unfailing dedication to our independence. I am very 
proud to highlight that we have succeeded in upholding 
our independence and in strengthening our position on 
the institutional landscape, even in difficult times, even 
in the face of often unjustified criticism that triggered 
reactions which could have weakened the Office. 
I also think that we have done the most with the tools 
that were granted to OLAF by the legislators. We’ve 
reached the much-wished for “cruising altitude” in in-
vestigative performance, but in order to do more, the 
investigative tools available to us need to be updated to 
match the complexity of our cases and of today’s fraud 
scenarios. The truth is that OLAF was given an ambi-
tious investigative mandate, but was only endowed with 
limited administrative powers. Access to bank account 
information, the unhindered ability to gather necessary 
evidence, and a clear authority to interview witness-
es – these are all things we are currently missing. Even 
our Final Reports lack the same evidentiary value in all 
EU Members - after receiving the OLAF Final Report, 
many national prosecutors need carry out all the inves-
tigative activities afresh in order to acquire admissible 
evidence. This slows down the administration of justice 
and sometimes allows fraudsters to escape from the en-
forcement net.
Luckily, progress is within our reach. Right now, 
Regulation 883/2013, the legal text governing the work 
of OLAF, is being reviewed. This puts us in a unique po-
sition to analyse what works, as well as what could be 
improved. It is a matter of assessing what OLAF is, but 
looking towards the future at what it could become. 
In my view, future should be guided by reform. The fu-
ture I would want for OLAF means updating Regulation 
883 in a way that allows us to have the tools we need to 
perform the investigative acts necessary to solve even 
the toughest fraud cases, and to generate evidence that 
can be relied on in national courts. As anti-fraud inves-
tigators, we need the right tools to perform investiga-
tions into possibly illicit financial flows, to follow the 
money throughout the fraudulent chain, as well as clear 
access to the premises of those economic operators or 
Institutions who may have been involved in fraudulent 
activities.
For the past several years, OLAF has actively participat-
ed in the drafting of the European Commission’s pro-
posal of creating a strong European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office, an initiative I have taken every opportunity to 
openly support. It only made sense that faced with in-
creasingly transnational cases of fraud with EU funds, 
the EPPO would create a truly European common space 
of justice. It is now clear that the EPPO has moved in 
the direction of enhanced cooperation and that not all 
EU Member States will be a part of it. In Member States 
that choose not to participate in this initiative, the 
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EPPO would not be competent for all offences against 
the Union’s financial interests. Therefore, it will face im-
portant limitations to its ability to investigate and pros-
ecute these offences across the whole EU.  
With this in mind, and knowing that its work will be 
indispensable in complementing that of the EPPO, re-
flecting on the future of OLAF is more important than 
ever. The groundwork is here - OLAF is already an es-
tablished, efficient, professional service. We have seen 
what OLAF can achieve on its own. Now we need to 
also reflect on ways in which OLAF can support and 
enhance the work of the EPPO. OLAF will play a prom-
inent role to ensure an equivalent level of protection 
in both the Member States that will participate in the 
EPPO, and in the ones that will not do so. The Office will 
continue to conduct its investigations in non-participat-
ing Member States, sending judicial recommendations 
where offences against the European Union’s financial 
interests are detected, as well as in the participating 
Member States in situations where the EPPO chooses 
not to act. By working together, OLAF and EPPO will 
truly be able to close the circle of the protection of the 
European Union’s financial interests. 
The past seven years have taught me that with passion, 
drive and determination, nothing is impossible. OLAF 
has achieved excellent results in complete independ-
ence, with a staff fully dedicated to working for the 
benefit of the European citizens, and supported by a co-
hesive team of managers who have revitalised the work 
of the Office. Looking towards the future, and notably 
the creation of the EPPO, I am genuinely enthusiastic 
about what’s in store for the Office. As I see it – the 
only way is up!
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12. Statistical annex: additional data 
on OLAF investigative activity
This annex presents additional detailed data relating to OLAF’s investigative activity in 2016,  
as a complement to the key indicators already mentioned in chapters 2 and 4.
Figure 17: OLAF’s investigative performance 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Incoming information 959 975 1041 1264 1294 1417 1372 1136
Investigations opened 160 152 146 431 253 234 219 219
Investigations concluded 140 136 154 266 293 250 304 272
Recommendations issued 194 172 175 199 353 397 364 346
Figure 18: Selections completed and their duration
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Selections completed 1007 886 926 1770 1247 1353 1442 1157
Average duration (in months) of selection phase 5.8 6.3 6.8 1.4 1.8 2.0 1.7 1.7
Figure 19: Average duration of closed and ongoing investigations (in months)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Average duration of investigation 20.2 20.8 22.4 17.3 17.5 18.1 18.7 17.2
Average duration of selection 
corresponding to these cases
5.7 6.4 6.9 6.3 4.3 2.9 2.3 1.7
Total average duration of cases 25.9 27.2 29.3 23.6 21.8 21.0 21.0 18.9
Figure 20: Average duration of closed investigations only (in months)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Average duration of investigation 25.8 22.9 27.0 22.5 22.3 23.3 25.1 23.2
Average duration of selection 
corresponding to these cases
5.6 5.6 6.1 7.5 5.9 3.6 2.8 1.8
Total average duration of cases 31.4 28.5 33.1 30.0 28.2 26.9 27.9 25.0
Figure 21: Recommendations issued
Type of recommendation 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Financial 76 62 63 116 233 253 220 209
Judicial 61 67 73 54 85 101 98 87
Disciplinary 18 10 16 25 24 15 16 18
Administrative 39 33 23 4 11 28 30 32
Total 194 172 175 199 353 397 364 346
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Figure 22: Incoming information by source
Source 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
PRIVATE 523 594 767 889 889 959 933 756
PUBLIC 436 381 274 375 405 458 439 380
Total 959 975 1041 1264 1294 1417 1372 1136
Figure 23: Incoming information from Member States in 2016
Member State Public source Private source Total
Austria 1 7 8
Belgium 11 14 25
Bulgaria 1 32 33
Croatia 2 4 6
Cyprus 0 1 1
Czech Republic 1 19 20
Denmark 2 2 4
Estonia 0 3 3
Finland 1 1 2
France 0 11 11
Germany 6 29 35
Greece 4 11 15
Hungary 2 20 22
Ireland 0 3 3
Italy 8 15 23
Latvia 1 2 3
Lithuania 2 6 8
Luxembourg 1 4 5
Malta 1 1 2
Netherlands 2 4 6
Poland 2 18 20
Portugal 1 4 5
Romania 2 33 35
Slovakia 2 16 18
Slovenia 1 5 6
Spain 7 23 30
Sweden 0 1 1
United Kingdom 3 14 17
Total 64 303 367
52
The OLAF report 2016
Overview of tables and charts
Figure 1: EU expenditure in 2016 ..................................................................................................................................................................................................11
Figure 2: EU revenue in 2016 ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................11
Figure 3: OLAF’s investigative activity in 2016: maintaining excellent results ........................................................................................12
Figure 4: An example of undervaluation fraud uncovered by OLAF ...............................................................................................................13
Figure 5: Investigations into the use of EU funds managed in whole or in part at national or regional level 
concluded in 2016 .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................14
Figure 6: Ongoing investigations at the end of 2016, divided by sector ......................................................................................................14
Figure 7: Investigations into EU staff and members of the Institutions concluded in 2016 ..........................................................23
Figure 8: Cigarettes seized with the support of OLAF (rounded to million sticks) .............................................................................25
Figure 9: Amount recommended by OLAF for financial recovery in 2016 (million EUR) ................................................................28
Figure 10: Member State/OLAF detection of irregularities and their financial impact in the area  
of Traditional Own Resources for the period 2013-2016 .......................................................................................................................................... 30
Figure 11: Member State/OLAF detection of irregularities and their financial impact in the areas of Structural 
Funds and Agriculture for the period 2013-2016 ..............................................................................................................................................................31
Figure 12: Actions taken by national judicial authorities (JA) following OLAF’s recommendations  
issued between 1 January 2009 and December 2016 .................................................................................................................................................. 33
Figure 13: Actions taken by the appointing authorities following OLAF’s Disciplinary Recommendations  
issued between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2016 .............................................................................................................................................34
Figure 14: Number and breakdown of OLAF staff from 2009 to 2016 ........................................................................................................ 44
Figure 15: OLAF’s administrative budget in 2016 (million EUR) .........................................................................................................................45
Figure 16: Organisational chart .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 46
Figure 17: OLAF’s investigative performance  ................................................................................................................................................................. 50
Figure 18: Selections completed and their duration ................................................................................................................................................... 50
Figure 19: Average duration of closed and ongoing investigations (in months) ................................................................................... 50
Figure 20: Average duration of closed investigations only (in months) ...................................................................................................... 50
Figure 21: Recommendations issued ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 50
Figure 22: Incoming information by source ........................................................................................................................................................................51
Figure 23: Incoming information from Member States in 2016 ...........................................................................................................................51
Printed by The Publications Oﬃ  ce of the European Union in Luxembourg
Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is 
responsible for the use that might be made of the following information.
Luxembourg: Publications Oﬃ  ce of the European Union, 2017
© European Union, 2017
Reuse is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
The reuse policy of European Commission documents is regulated by Decision 2011/833/EU 
(OJ L 330, 14.12.2011, p. 39).
For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the EU copyright, 
permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders.
Photo Credits:
Cover: OLAF, 2017
Pages 5, 8, 9, 15, 17, 21, 24, 26, 32, 34, 39, 40, 45, 47, 48: © European Union, 2017
Page 10: © iStock.com/wabeno
Print ISBN 978-92-79-63039-2 ISSN 1977-4834 doi:10.2784/22494 OB-AD-17-001-EN-C
PDF ISBN 978-92-79-63034-7 ISSN 2315-2494 doi:10.2784/701686 OB-AD-17-001-DE-N
The Fraud Notification System (FNS) is a web-based tool 
available to any person who seeks to pass on information 
concerning potential corruption and fraud.
http://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/olaf-and-you/report-fraud_en
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU
In person
All over the European Union there are hundreds of 
Europe Direct Information Centres. You can fi nd the 
address of the centre nearest you at: http://europa.eu/
contact
On the phone or by e-mail
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions 
about the European Union. You can contact this service 
– by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators 
may charge for these calls), 
– at the following standard number: +32 22999696 or 
– by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU
Online
Information about the European Union in all the oﬃ  cial languages of the EU 
is available on the Europa website at: http://europa.eu  
EU Publications
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU 
Bookshop at: http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of free 
publications may be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local 
information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact)
EU law and related documents
For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1951 
in all the oﬃ  cial language versions, go to EUR-Lex at: http://eur-lex.europa.
eu
Open data from the EU
The EU Open Data Portal (http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data) provides 
access to datasets from the EU. Data can be downloaded and reused for 
free, both for commercial and non-commercial purposes.
The OLAF 
report 2016
ISSN 2315-2494
